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This paper investigates whether human capital affects the productivity and labor
allocation of rural households in four districts of Pakistan. The investigation shows that
households with better-educated males earn higher off-farm income and divert labor
resources away from farm activities toward nonfarm work. Education has no significant
effect on productivity in crop and livestock production. The effect of human capital on
household incomes is partly realized through the reallocation of labor from low-
productivity activities to nonfarm work. Female education and nutrition do not affect
productivity and labor allocation in any systematic fashion, a finding that is consistent with
the marginal role women play in market-oriented activities in Pakistan. As a by-product,
our estimation approach also tests the existence of perfect labor and factor markets; the
hypothesis that such markets exist is strongly rejected. CONTENTS
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International Food Policy Research Institute1.  INTRODUCTION
The role of human capital in the development process has attracted a lot of attention
since the seminal contributions of Schultz (1961), Becker (1964), and Welch (1970). 
Recently, growth theorists such as Romer (1986, 1990), Lucas (1988, 1993), Stokey
(1988, 1991), and others (for example, Azariadis and Drazen 1990; Ciccone 1994) have
shown that the accumulation of human capital can sustain long-term growth. These
theories have received support from the empirical work of economic historians such as
Fogel (1990) and from macroeconomic regression analysis emphasizing the positive role
of education on growth (for example, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil 1992; Barro and
Sala-i-Martin 1992, 1995).  Microeconomic evidence on this issue is both abundant and
varied (see Jamison and Lau 1982 and Psacharopoulos 1984 and 1985 for surveys).
Although there is little doubt that better-educated workers earn higher wages in the
modern sector, whether education raises farm productivity remains a contentious issue. A
widely-cited survey by Lockheed, Jamison, and Lau (1980) summarizes 39 equations from
18 different studies in 13 countries, concluding that education has a positive effect on farm
productivity.  Phillips (1987) argues that these results vary substantially by geographic
region. Studies from Asia support the positive and significant relationship between
education and farm efficiency, but the evidence from Latin America and Africa is mixed. 2
Newman and Gertler (1994) estimate a structural model of wages, marginal returns to farmwork, and
1
marginal rates of substitution for different demographic groups within the household, taking into account the
jointness of production and consumption among rural landholding households in Peru.  Jolliffe (1996)
estimates the returns to education in farm and off-farm work, and finds that they are much higher in the latter,
thus affecting the allocation of labor in Ghanaian farm households.  Yang (1997) considers the possibility that
better-educated household members move into off-farm activities in China, and finds that schooling does not
contribute to physical efficiency in farming but raises off-farm wages. The best educated person in the
household, however, may make farm management decisions while participating in off-farm work.
The purpose of this paper is to revisit this issue, using a panel survey of rural households
from Pakistan.
This paper's contribution to the literature arises from its joint treatment of two
issues that have usually been treated separately: the relationship between human capital
and productivity, and the choice of farm and off-farm work.  While a number of studies,
for example, Jamison and Lau (1982) and the sources cited therein, examine the effects of
human capital on agricultural output, they do not consider the allocation of labor between
farm and off-farm activities. Unlike the works of Huffman (1980), Huffman and Lange
(1989), and Kimhi (1996a, 1996b), the former strand of the literature seldom considers the
endogeneity of labor inputs.  Following Newman and Gertler (1994), Jolliffe (1996), and
Yang (1997), this paper considers not only how human capital raises productivity, but also
how households with different human capital endowments allocate labor to different
activities.   If returns to education are highest in a particular activity, better educated
1
households should reallocate their manpower to that activity, thereby providing evidence
about the effect of education on output.  This paper also moves beyond studies that focus
either on crop production (for example, Jamison and Lau 1982 and the studies reviewed
therein) or wages (for example, Alderman et al. 1996b; Haddad and Bouis 1991; Sahn and3
The inclusion of several dimensions of human capital is a growing trend in the literature.  For
2
example, Haddad and Bouis (1991), Thomas and Strauss (1997), and Foster and Rosenzweig (1994) include
individual-level calorie intake, height, and body mass index (BMI), in addition to education, in their studies
of wage determinants in the rural Philippines and urban Brazil.  Alderman et al. (1996a) examine the effects
of cognitive skills, BMI, and height, in addition to experience and education, in their work on men's wage
labor in rural Pakistan.
Alderman 1988) and examines all the market-oriented activities of the household.  This
enables us to decompose the effect of human capital on total household income into a
labor reallocation effect and activity-specific productivity effects.  Our analysis also
encompasses several complementary measures of human capital, enabling us to better
disentangle the effects of education from other dimensions of human capital such as
nutrition and innate ability.   Finally, our study contains several methodological
2
innovations that ensure that the results are robust and as free as possible from endogeneity
and omitted-variable bias. 
The paper is organized as follows.  We begin in Section 2 by introducing the
conceptual framework underlying our work and discussing various econometric issues. 
The data are presented in Section 3.  Regression results are examined in Sections 4 for
income and 5 for labor.  We find that households with better-educated males earn higher
off-farm income and divert labor resources away from farm activities toward nonfarm
work.  Education has no significant effect on productivity in crop and livestock
production.  The effect of human capital on household incomes is partly realized through
the reallocation of labor from low- to high-productivity activities, that is, nonfarm work.
Female education and nutrition do not affect productivity and labor allocation in any
systematic fashion.  This is in line with the marginal role women play in market-oriented4
activities in Pakistan.  As a by-product, our estimation approach also tests the existence of
perfect labor and factor markets.  The hypothesis that these markets exist is strongly
rejected.  Finally, we find evidence of fixed costs in undertaking income-generating
activities.  Conclusions are presented in Section 6.
2.  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
We begin by presenting a simple conceptual framework for evaluating the effect of
human capital on productivity and labor allocation. Consider rural households that derive
their livelihood from several competing income-generating activities, indexed by a.  A
production function, g , is associated with each of these activities: a
Y  = g (L , X , T , Z), (1) a    a a   a   a
where Y  denotes income, L  denotes labor, X  is a vector of variable inputs, and T  stands a      a      a                a
for tools, equipment, and other semi-fixed factors.  Z is a vector of human capital
characteristics of the household.  Human capital may affect Y  in a variety of ways:  better a
nutrition increases physical strength and raises labor efficiency; better education improves
management and thus raises technological and allocative efficiency; leadership improves
labor supervision skills.  To the extent that human capital raises productivity, we expect a
significant positive relationship between Y  and Z.  This possibility can be investigated by a
examining whether Z raises output Y , after controlling for inputs and semi-fixed factors.  a
Human capital may raise the productivity of different inputs differently:  the ability toF
5
A collective model of the households does not seem required here given the extremely limited
3
involvement of women in market-oriented activities in rural Pakistan (for example, Alderman and Chishti
1991; Brown and Haddad 1995; Sathar and Desai 1996).
better supervise workers and reduce shirking should raise the effectiveness of labor, not
add to capital or land.  The same can be said about nutrition.  In contrast, better
management skills could raise the productivity of all inputs and factors of production.  To
test whether human capital is not Hicks-neutral, one can verify whether Z raises the
effectiveness of L  and T  differently in the production of Y . a    a            a
It is also possible that human capital increases allocative efficiency without affecting
technological efficiency—that is, that better-educated or smarter individuals choose more
profitable levels of inputs.  In this case, Z should affect net income but not necessarily
gross revenue.  Similarly, better-managed households may be better at taking advantage of
economies of scope between activities.  In this case, Z might affect the total net income of
the household without necessarily affecting the productivity of individual activities. 
Analysis along these lines has been conducted by other researchers with varying degrees of
sophistication (for example, Jamison and Lau 1982 and the studies cited therein); details
are not presented here.
The productivity effects of human capital can also be investigated by observing how
it affects household labor and input decisions.  Let household choices be represented as an
optimization problem whereby available manpower,  , is allocated between leisure and
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subject to production functions (see equation [1]) and to nonnegativity constraints,
U(.) is the household's utility function defined over income and leisure. S stands for
unearned income, p for the price of inputs, w for the market wage rate, and F  is a
manpower allocated to activity a.  If markets for labor, inputs, and output are perfect,
production decisions can be separated from preferences (for example, Singh, Squire, and
Strauss 1986).  Profit maximization then dictates that the return to variable inputs be
equated with their price: 
Solving the above system of equations yields labor- and input-use equations
andX
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where the superscript D indicates demand (for labor and inputs, respectively), h ( ) is the a
labor-use equation, and f ( ) is the input-use equation. The effect of Z on labor and inputs a
can be studied by totally differentiating equations (4) and (5) to yield
where we have dropped the a subscript to improve readability.  Y  denotes the partial LX
derivative of Y with respect to L and X, and so on for other terms.  A similar expression
can be derived for dX/dZ.  Marginal returns to individual inputs are, as usual, assumed to
be decreasing, that is, Y  and Y  are negative.  The denominator of equation (6) is the LL    XX
second order condition, which must be negative at an interior optimum.  Equation (6) thus
shows that, if Y , Y , and Y  are all nonnegative, labor use must go up with Z.  In other LZ   XZ     LX
words, if human capital raises the marginal productivity of either labor or variable inputs
or both, then it should also raise labor use, provided variable inputs increase marginal
returns to labor.  The same holds for variable inputs X.  We have no a priori reason to
suspect that variable inputs reduce marginal returns to labor in the farm and nonfarm
activities of rural Pakistani households.  Consequently, we expect labor and variable input
use to go up if human capital raises their productivity.ja Fa ’ F(w (, S % w ( ¯ F % j
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The situation is somewhat different if labor markets are imperfect.  In this case,
de Janvry, Fafchamps, and Sadoulet (1991) have shown that household choices can be
represented as a system of labor demand and supply with endogenous shadow cost of
labor w .  The factors that influence w  can be identified by noting that utility maximization
*            *
yields a household labor supply of the form
where A  (.) is the profit function associated with activity a.  If leisure is a normal good,
a
the derivative of F(.) with respect to w  is positive and with respect to income is negative. 
*
With these assumptions, factors that raise income also raise the shadow cost of labor w . 
*
To see why, equation (7) is totally differentiated with respect to w  and, say, unearned
*
income, S, while keeping total labor use,   constant.  We get
which is positive if the partial derivative of family labor supply with respect to income and
wage, F  and F , are negative and positive, respectively.  Other factors that reduce family Y    w
labor supply exert a similar upward pressure on the shadow wage, w .  The allocation of
*
family labor to activity a thus depends, through w , on household manpower,  , unearned
*
income, S, and productive assets in other activities, T  (see Evenson 1978; de Janvry, a
Fafchamps, and Sadoulet 1991).  Labor and input use equations,L
D
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Although we focus here on imperfections in the labor market, it is well known that efficient allocation
4
of productive resources—and hence separability between production decisions and consumption
preferences—only requires that N–1 markets be perfect, where N is the number of productive factors.  For
instance, if crops are produced with labor, land, and fertilizer, allocative efficiency can result even if a labor
market is missing—provided the land and fertilizer markets are perfect; see, for instance, Udry (1996) and
Gavian and Fafchamps (1996).  In rural Pakistan, land transactions are even less frequent than labor
transactions, so that it is natural to think of land as a semi-fixed factor and to focus the discussion on labor
markets.
and
can be estimated indirectly by replacing w  with a function of the household's manpower
*
stock,  , unearned income, S, and all its productive assets.
Comparing the models with and without perfect markets yields a number of testable
predictions.   First, if markets are perfect and w  = w, labor and input in activity a should
4               *
depend only on wages, prices, and semi-fixed factors in that activity, not on unearned
income and household characteristics such as household size and composition.  Only if
economies of scope are present should labor and input use in one activity be influenced by
fixed factors in other activities.  These ideas are at the basis of tests of perfect markets and
allocative efficiency conducted by Benjamin (1992) and Udry (1996).  Second, if
markets are perfect, productive assets, T , should only have an income effect on household a
labor supply through their effect on profits,  .  Hence the sign of T  and a









are imperfect, T  could raise labor supply through its positive effect on returns to family a
labor, w .  If this effect is strong enough, T  may raise labor supply even when nonearned
*
a
income, S, lowers it.  Finally, if markets are perfect and economies of scope are absent,
factors that raise returns to labor in one activity should have no effect on labor use in
another activity.  In contrast, if markets are imperfect, higher returns to labor in one
activity raise w , thereby leading to a reduction of labor in other activities.  If, for instance,
*
schooling increases returns to labor in off-farm but not farmwork, this should reduce labor
use in farmwork only if markets are imperfect.
In case we find evidence of market imperfections, it would be interesting to uncover
the source of the imperfection.  Our data on rural Pakistan indicate that most surveyed
households are self-sufficient in labor and supply very little agricultural labor to the
market.  This situation is not unusual in poor developing countries (for example, Cleave
1974; Fafchamps 1993).  One possible explanation suggested in the theoretical literature is
the need to supervise hired workers (for example, Eswaran and Kotwal 1986; Dutta, Ray,
and Sengupta 1989; Feder 1985; Frisvold 1994).  This idea can be formalized by
postulating that the effectiveness of labor depends on the share of total labor supplied by
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where   denotes effective labor, L  is total labor in man-days, and F  is household labor a              a
devoted to activity a.  The parameter   measures the importance of supervision:  if
, hired labor is as effective as household labor; if  , household labor is more
effective than hired labor, suggesting that labor supervision is problematic for hired-in
workers.  Whether issues of labor supervision are the reason behind market imperfections
can thus be investigated by adding an F  / L  term to the production function equation and a    a
testing whether its coefficient is positive and significant.
3.  CHARACTERISTICS OF SURVEYED HOUSEHOLDS
The data on which our analysis is based come from 12 rounds of a household survey
conducted by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in four districts of
Pakistan between July 1986 and September 1989 (see Nag-Chowdhury 1991 for details). 
A panel of almost 1,000 randomly selected households in 44 randomly selected villages
were interviewed at 3- to 4-month intervals on a variety of issues ranging from incomes,
agricultural activities, and labor choices to anthropometrics, education, land, and livestock
(see Adams and He 1995; Alderman and Garcia 1993).  Responses to these questions
were combined by us to generate a consistent data set containing annual information about
household composition, income, assets, inherited land, human capital, and labor.  All asset
variables refer to the beginning of the year. 
The basic characteristics of the surveyed households are presented in Table 1.  The
median household size is eight people, half of whom are adults. Sources of income are 12
Table 1—Sample summary statistics
Number of Sample Standard
Household composition observations mean Median deviation
Total household size 2,509 8.7 8 4.3
Adult males (20-65) 2,509 2.0 2 1.2
Adult females (20-65) 2,509 1.8 1 1.1
Young (6-20) 2,509 3.1 3 2.3
Children (0-5) 2,509 1.6 1 1.6
Old (>65) 2,509 0.3 0 0.6
Income (in 1986 rupees)
Total income 2,202  29,457  20,584  34,635 
a
Net crop income 2,202  7,355  2,138  21,420 
Net livestock income 2,202  4,566  3,643  6,176 
Wages from agricultural work 2,202  287  0  1,210 
Nonfarm earned income 2,202  8,823  6,036  10,067 
Rental income 2,202  3,876  0  14,879 
Remittances and transfers 2,202  4,573  0  17,427 
b
Assets
Total land owned (acres) 2,526  8.4  2.0  18.4 
c
Irrigated land owned (acres) 2,526  3.8  0.0  9.7 
Rainfed land owned (acres) 2,526  2.9  0.0  10.2 
Total land owned by father (acres) 2,299  11.7  0.5  29.8 
Inherited land (acres) 2,299  5.1  0.0  15.5 
Value of farm tools and equipment (rupees) 2,374  9,054  1,011  27,359 
Number of cattle 2,526  2.0  1  2.7 
Number of buffaloes 2,526  1.8  0  2.6 
Number of bullocks 2,526  0.3  0  0.8 
Number of donkeys 2,526  0.2  0  0.7 
Number of sheep and goats 2,526  2.9  2  4.9 
Labor (days)
Kharif family labor 2,526  70  27  106 
Rabi family labor 2,526  46  20  68 
Kharif hired labor 2,526  7  0  38 
Rabi hired labor 2,526  7  0  26 
Herding labor 2,526  135  36  250 
Agricultural wage labor 2,526  0  0  7 
Nonfarm labor 2,526  214  141  265 
 Water tax is deducted from total income.
a
 Ninety-six percent of received transfers are remittances.
b
 Difference between total land and irrigated and rainfed land is noncultivable land—mostly pastures.
c13
quite varied.  Crops account for about one-fourth of average income; livestock accounts
for another 15 percent.  Nonfarm earned income—a mix of wages and self-employment
income from crafts, trade, and services—represents 30 percent of average income; rental
income and remittances amount to another 30 percent.  Agricultural wage income is
negligible among sample households.  As already noted by Alderman and Garcia (1993)
and by Adams and He (1995), livestock and nonfarm income are more equally distributed
than crop income, rental income, or remittances.  On average, households own eight acres
of land, half of which is either canal- or well-irrigated.  The median is much smaller,
however, indicating that land is unequally distributed.  The data also show large
differences among households in inherited land and in the amount of land owned by the
father of the household head.  These two variables, in addition to the education of the
father and mother of the household head, are used throughout as instruments for family
background.  Households spend roughly as much time herding as they do in crop
production.  Hired labor—mostly male—accounts, on average, for as little as 2.6 percent
and 8.5 percent of total labor devoted to cultivation in the kharif and rabi seasons,
respectively.  Ninety-one percent of kharif farmers and 89 percent of rabi farmers do not
use any hired labor.  The use of outside help is somewhat higher at harvesttime:  it
accounts for 21.5 percent and 23.6 percent of total labor for kharif and rabi, respectively. 
Surveyed households do not report employing any wage worker for either herding or
nonfarm activities.  Although surveyed households use some hired labor for crop
production, they spend very little time hiring themselves out as laborers.  The sample may14
Panel surveys have a tendency to underrepresent wage laborers who are typically more mobile than
5
farming households and have a higher probability of dropping out of subsequent survey rounds.  The resulting
attrition bias is not explicitly addressed in this paper due to the absence of suitable instruments, but it should
be kept in mind when interpreting the results.
See Ibraz 1993 and Jefferey 1979.  Although purdah is now seen by many Pakistanis as a religious
6
obligation prescribed by Islam, it was practiced by Muslims and Hindus alike before the partition of India.
In his study of Punjab in the 1920s, for instance, Darling (1925) notes that Hindu Rajputs were the most
dedicated to the practice, "a status symbol for which they pay dearly [in terms of wasted manpower and
reduced profits]."
Because of purdah, respondents are likely to have underreported female participation in market-
7
oriented work.
See Strauss and Thomas (1995) for a comprehensive review of attempts to account for various
8
dimensions of human capital in measuring labor markets, health, and nutrition outcomes.
thus underrepresent farm laborers who are the poorest segments of rural society.   Wage
5
work in nonfarm activities is common, though. Male members of the household do 84
percent of the crop work, 99 percent of herding, and 95 percent of nonfarm work.  This is
largely a consequence of purdah,  a system of secluding women, restricting them from
6
moving into public places and enforcing high standards of female modesty upon them. 
This system limits women's mobility outside the home and restricts their participation in
market work.   Women work mostly in or around the home.
7
Human capital variables are presented in Table 2.  They include experience proxied
by age and age squared; education measured in years of schooling; innate ability measured
by Raven's test scores; childhood nutrition measured by height; and current nutritional
status measured by the body mass index (BMI).   As a measure of experience, we use age
8
and age squared rather than years of post-schooling wage work because, unlike in
Alderman et al. (1996b), rates of school attendance are extremely low among older adult
males and among adult females.  Age and age squared are also more15
Table 2—Human capital summary statistics
Number of Sample Standard
observations mean Median deviation
Husband and wife
Age of head 2,436  48.2  47.0  13.7 
Years of education of head 2,436  2.8  0.0  4.1 
Raven's test of head 1,951  19.3  19.0  6.7 
BMI of head 1,950  20.4  20.0  3.1 
Height of head 2,395  167.3  168.0  6.5 
Average days ill of head 2,441  15.0  1.0  33.3 
Age of wife 2,242  41.5  40.0  12.1 
a
Years of education of wife 2,242  0.3  0.0  1.5 
a
Raven's test of wife 1,884  14.5  14.0  5.1 
a
BMI of wife 1,876  21.2  20.5  4.0 
a
Height of wife 2,014  152.4  152.0  6.5 
a
Average days ill of wife 2,253  6.2  0.0  15.1
Household averages
Average age of adult males 2,497  38.0  37.0  8.6 
Average years of education of adult males 2,497  3.7  2.5  3.9 
Average Raven's test of adult males 2,075  20.1  19.5  6.2 
Average BMI of adult males 1,987  20.4  20.0  2.9 
Average height of adult males 2,426  167.4  167.5  6.1 
Average days ill of adult males 2,457  11.1  1.0  27.3 
Average age of adult females 2,493  37.1  36.0  8.2 
Average years of education of adult females 2,493  0.6  0.0  1.6 
Average Raven's test of adult females 2,165  14.7  14.0  4.9 
Average BMI of adult females 2,198  21.0  20.7  3.5 
Average height of adult females 2,322  152.4  152.0  6.2 
Average days ill of adult females 2,394  5.8  0.0  13.7 
 In polygamous households, average over all wives.
a16
Years of schooling also influences achievement as measured in test scores, for example, Glewwe and
9
Jacoby (1994).  The impact of test scores on rural labor market outcomes in Pakistan has been investigated
by Alderman et al. (1996b).  We do not use the math and reading scores because of the much lower number
of valid observations.
appropriate to capture life-cycle effects.  Years of schooling is a measure of formal
investment in human capital. Raven's (1956) Colored Progressive Matrices Test
recognizes changes in patterns across a series of four pictures.  It was initially developed
to measure abstract thinking ability among illiterate children and has been widely used as a
proxy for intelligence among illiterate adults in developing countries (for example, Knight
and Sabot 1990).  While abstract thinking ability, or ability to learn, is different from
formal instruction, it can be affected by schooling.  Since parents may choose to educate
only those children with academic potential, years of schooling is likely to be correlated
with innate ability.  Raven's test scores thus reflect both innate ability and schooling.  The
explanatory power of Raven's test, conditional on years of schooling, is its ability to
measure innate ability.
9
Height and BMI proxy health and nutrition aspects of human capital.  The BMI is
defined as weight (in kilograms) divided by height (in meters) squared, a commonly used
measure of fitness and nutritional status.  Combined with other simple anthropometric
measurements such as height, it has been shown to be a good predictor of muscular mass
and physical strength among populations of developing countries (for example, Conlisk et
al. 1992).  Height, when evaluated for adults, captures the cumulative effects of childhood
and adolescent nutrition as well as genetic endowments.  Unlike BMI, it is not subject to
short-term fluctuations.  In this paper, we use only adult height to minimize endogeneity,17
We also experiment with self-reported days of illness as a measure of health status. While it is true
10
that illness episodes may affect both the amount and efficiency of labor supplied, self-reported illness has been
argued to be contaminated by self-reporting biases, with higher-income or more-educated individuals more
likely to report being ill (for example, Sindelar and Thomas 1993). Illness episodes may also be correlated
with factors that affect individuals' long-term productivity; a large literature on illness shows that the
probability of illness is higher among less wealthy and less educated families (for example, Akin, Guilkey,
and Popkin 1992). For these reasons, we treat the available information on sick days with caution. Labor
allocation regress-ions with illness days are available at the following website:
http://www-leland.stanford.edu/~fafchamp.
In case of polygamous households, we take the average over all wives.  The number of female-headed
11
households in the sample is less than 1 percent.
that is, the possibility that taller parents may have taller offspring.  We also investigate the
possible endogeneity of current BMI by using lagged BMI in the sensitivity analysis.   
10
Two separate sets of human capital variables are constructed for each household. In the
first set, individual characteristics are averaged by gender over all household members 20
years and older, irrespective of their relationship to the head of household.  The second set
contains only information about the head of household and his wife.   The reason for
11
constructing this second set is twofold.  First, using average human capital of adult males
and females may mask variations within these categories.  Indeed, the head of the
household and his wife are likely to have more decisionmaking power than other
household members.  Second, household averages may be subject to endogeneity bias:  the
prosperity and genes of the parents may be reflected in their offspring, thereby opening the
door to a reverse causation between productivity and household-based human capital
averages.  Although less vulnerable to such problems, human capital of the husband and
wife are only partial measures and therefore subject to measurement error.  Moreover, if
marriage-market selection exists, characteristics of husbands and wives are likely to be
correlated (for example, Foster 1995).  Since neither measure is perfect, our analysis is18
conducted using both and we regard results about human capital as robust when they are
present in both formulations.  Following Jolliffe (1997) and Yang (1997), an alternative
measure, the schooling of the most educated male or female in the household, is also used
in the sensitivity analysis.
The two sets of variables are summarized in Table 2.  The average head has spent
2.8 years in school; the median is zero.  Female members of the household have a much
lower level of education than males.  Forty percent of males have no education versus 86
percent for females.  Women also show a significantly lower score on Raven's test of
progressive matrices, a test that supposedly measures innate ability irrespective of literacy
level.  This may be attributed to socially acquired attitudes by which women "try less hard"
to perform than men, compounded by less familiarity with formal tests due to their lack of
schooling (for example, Alderman et al. 1996a).  The correlation coefficient between years
of schooling and Raven's test score is fairly low, however:  .43 for men, .28 for women. 
The sample population is short and, with average BMIs as low as 20.4 for males and 21
for females, only marginally well fed.  Although women are less educated than men and
rank lower in Raven's tests, they have a higher BMI.  The t-test statistic for equality of
means between male and female BMI's is highly significant (6.99 with 1,776 degrees of
freedom for male and female averages; 6.81 with 1,441 degrees of freedom for head and
wife).  This is a common result due to the fact that women are shorter and have more
body fat as a proportion of body weight (for example, Gibson 1990); it does not indicate
that women in the sample are better-fed than men.  The nutritional status of males and
females within the same household appear unrelated:  the coefficient of correlation19
between average male and female BMIs is .17.  Women report less days lost to sickness,
but we suspect that this may be due to self-reporting bias:  women spend most of their
time within the home where being sick is less disruptive and less noticeable.  In contrast,
men do all the work outside the home where their ability to work would suffer from
reduced mobility and where sickness is harder to accommodate within one's routine.
4.  TESTING THE PRODUCTIVITY OF HUMAN CAPITAL
We now test whether human capital raises productivity in any of the four activities
in which the surveyed farmers are involved:  kharif and rabi crop production; livestock
raising; and nonfarm work.  We proceed in two steps.  In this section, we estimate
production functions for the four activities and examine whether human capital has a
significant effect on productivity.  In the next section, we turn to labor allocation and
estimate labor demand and supply equations.
CROP INCOME
Our choice of a suitable function form for the production functions is guided by two
considerations:  adequacy and parsimony.  Consider crop production first.  Since our main
concern is to estimate the effect of human capital on productivity, we focus on a simple
Cobb-Douglas formulation with three essential inputs:  land, labor, and farm tools.  NoAa (1 % Xa)

























Observations for which crop income is reported, but not labor or cultivated acreage, are treated as
12
cases with missing labor or land information; they are excluded from the regression analysis.  Observations
with no recorded crop output are also omitted from the regressions:  we suspect that many of them are for
pasture and fodder crops harvested by the animals themselves, and should thus be regarded as observations
with unrecorded output.
crop output can be obtained when any of these inputs is absent.   In contrast to land,
12
tools, and labor, inputs such as fertilizer, draft power, or pesticides are not essential since
some output can be obtained without them.  Nonessential inputs can be thought of as
raising the effectiveness of essential inputs.  For instance, expenditures on fertilizer and
other chemical inputs, X , are likely to raise the productivity of land.  To the extent that a
certain characteristics of land are in fixed supply and cannot be substituted for by chemical
inputs, X  is expected to raise the productivity of land in a decreasing fashion.  A simple a
parameterization that captures these ideas assumes that the contribution of land to total
output can be represented as  .  If  , X  does not add to land a
productivity; and if  , land measured in efficiency units rises with X .  Similar a
reasoning can be followed for human capital variables Z and other nonessential inputs.
Aggregation of different qualities of inputs must also be dealt with adequately. 
Crops can be produced on rainfed or irrigated land.  Although land itself is essential for
crop production, neither rainfed nor irrigated land are individually essential.  Yet the
productivity of land is likely to vary across land types.  We decompose land into rainfed
and irrigated and we define land in rainfed-equivalent units as  ,
where   denote rainfed- and irrigation-cultivated acreage, respectively.  
expresses the efficiency of irrigated land relative to rainfed land:  if   is more





















Sickness days are not included because much of their effect is already captured by the labor variable.
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(10)
counterproductive, that is, it subtracts from output.  Estimation is greatly simplified by
noting that for any number x close to 0, 1 + x is nearly equal to e .  Effective land can thus
x
be written approximately as  .  A similar approach can be used for other
aggregation problems among highly substitutable inputs.
After adding the labor supervision term, the crop production function becomes
where Y  is the total value of crop output, A  is planted acreage, B is the number of a                a
bullocks owned, and Greek letters stand for parameters to be estimated.  Given that Ya
cannot be negative and follows an approximatively log-normal distribution, it is natural to
postulate multiplicative disturbances.  Equation (10) is estimated by ordinary least squares
after taking logs of both sides.
There are 12 human capital variables used in the estimation, 6 for males and 6 for
females.  As discussed in Section 3, they are age and age squared, years of schooling,
Raven's test score, height, and BMI.   To control for possible omitted variable bias in the
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human capital variables, we add four variables that control for family background.  They
are the land owned by the household head's father; the land inherited by the household; the
education of the head's father; and the education of the head's mother.  Including these
variables should reduce fears that observed correlation between human capital and22
productivity in fact captures the effect of family background.  For instance, individuals
whose fathers farmed or who inherited more land probably received more exposure to
farming (for example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1985).  These individuals may enjoy higher
farm productivity thanks to returns to specific experience.  Similarly, if children from
landed households are better-fed and educated than those from landless families, and
family background is not controlled for, human capital variables may capture the effect of
exposure to farming, but not that of human capital itself.  Returns to education might also
be overestimated if analysis excludes parents' education.
Estimation results for kharif crop output and rabi crop output are reported in
Table 3.  We also estimate a combined (annual) crop output regression to investigate the
possibility that human capital increases a household's ability to allocate resources among
seasons without raising productivity within each season separately.  Results are presented
in the last four columns.  Two sets of regressions are run in each case, one using the
average human capital of the household, the other using only the human capital of the
head and his wife.  The latter set offers a less complete representation of the human capital
of the household, but it is not subject to the omitted variable bias that arises if better able
or better educated couples have both higher incomes and better-fed, better-educated
children.  Effects that are fixed for each village are included in all regressions2
3
Table 3—Crop production function estimation
                     Kharif output                                               Rabi output                                            Total crop output                  
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage 0.323 4.712 0.390 5.660 0.402 6.545 0.342 5.083 0.419 4.014 0.454 4.584
Share of irrigated acreage 0.478 1.853 0.344 1.063 –0.125 –0.570 0.095 0.439 0.104 0.289 0.435 1.496
Value of farm tools 0.116 3.387 0.123 3.048 0.038 1.384 0.071 2.025 –0.013 –0.280 0.154 2.723
Number of bullocks 0.397 3.561 0.444 3.483 0.211 2.680 0.208 2.255 0.371 3.072 0.367 2.842
Cultivation labor 0.190 3.623 0.159 2.937 –0.049 –1.265 –0.076 –1.673 0.155 2.282 0.094 1.181
Share of family labor 0.099 0.445 0.263 1.276 0.104 0.535 0.062 0.216 0.311 0.991 0.064 0.260
Input expenditures (log+1) 0.209 4.080 0.172 3.072 0.221 3.715 0.255 3.642 0.621 6.106 0.210 4.099
Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of
Human capital capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife
Males
Age –0.015 –0.388 0.017 0.522 0.015 0.590 0.011 0.497 –0.041 –0.963 –0.042 –1.217
Age squared 0.000 0.219 –0.000 –0.558 –0.000 –0.703 –0.000 –0.575 0.001 1.149 0.000 1.375
Years of education 0.011 0.630 0.021 1.261 –0.022 –1.930 –0.022 –1.799 0.037 1.771 0.011 0.532
Raven's test score 0.011 1.358 0.006 0.708 –0.003 –0.473 0.000 0.033 –0.007 –0.701 –0.006 –0.645
Height 0.017 2.105 0.010 1.106 0.006 0.979 –0.002 –0.348 0.008 0.790 0.001 0.128
BMI 0.016 1.046 0.028 1.691 0.022 1.978 0.015 1.114 –0.017 –0.801 –0.023 –1.005
Females
Age 0.033 0.878 –0.031 –0.883 –0.008 –0.301 0.007 0.211 –0.009 –0.242 0.022 0.615
Age squared –0.000 –0.927 0.000 0.984 0.000 0.263 –0.000 –0.517 –0.000 –0.127 –0.000 –0.805
Years of education 0.050 1.360 0.070 1.984 –0.034 –1.181 –0.017 –0.410 –0.082 –1.564 0.040 0.937
Raven's test score –0.012 –1.288 –0.011 –1.147 0.003 0.402 –0.017 –1.855 –0.006 –0.486 –0.009 –0.720
Height 0.003 0.341 0.016 1.769 0.004 0.716 0.003 0.551 –0.005 –0.440 –0.002 –0.182
BMI –0.003 –0.256 –0.001 –0.056 –0.000 –0.020 0.011 1.227 –0.017 –0.826 –0.018 –1.086
Family background
Land owned by father (log+1) –0.056 –1.364 –0.139 –2.613 0.031 0.798 –0.034 –0.666 –0.072 –1.028 –0.128 –1.390
Inherited acres (log+1) 0.020 0.344 0.133 1.915 0.028 0.660 0.077 1.311 0.140 1.579 0.241 2.073
Father's schooling 0.006 0.131 –0.010 –0.199 0.067 1.847 0.075 1.809 –0.045 –0.620 0.091 1.230
Mother's schooling –0.274 –1.162 –0.345 –1.330 0.062 0.411 –0.002 –0.008 0.008 0.019 –0.801 –1.380
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.434 –3.078 –0.431 –2.702 –0.276 –3.185 –0.331 –3.235 –0.756 –4.623 –0.512 –2.946
Dummy for 1987 –0.247 –1.892 –0.296 –1.862 –0.476 –5.697 –0.536 –5.554 –1.078 –5.916 –0.607 –3.311
Intercept 0.459 0.185 0.375 0.152 4.536 3.100 5.535 3.571 4.088 1.481 7.298 2.760
Number of observations 677 546 752 601 1,013 733
Number of households 404 332 413 343 480 375
R-squared 0.7231 0.7325 0.5919 0.5757 0.5226 0.4941
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Estimator is ordinary least squares with village fixed effects.  Zero land and zero labor
observations have been eliminated.  Robust standard errors with household clusters are reported.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log+1) means that the
regressor is computed as Log(x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.(a
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to control for soil, weather, and market conditions.  To minimize the bias naturally
resulting from correlation between harvesting labor and yield—a good harvest requires
more labor to gather crops in the field—harvesting labor is excluded from the labor
variable.  Labor thus includes only the reported labor for land preparation, irrigation, and
cultivation.  Robust standard errors with household clustering are reported to correct for
the possible correlation between error terms within each household.
Results indicate that cultivated acreage, farm tools, bullocks, cultivation labor, and
expenditures on variable inputs are good predictors of output.  Estimates of the
supervision parameter   are positive but not significant in any of the regressions,
suggesting that, if supervision costs are present, they are not large.  This result contrasts
with the findings reported by Frisvold (1994) that show supervised labor in rural India to
be significantly less productive than family labor.  Year and village dummies are
significant, confirming that crop production varies systematically across time and
space—hardly a surprising result.  Human capital variables are, in general, nonsignificant. 
Households with taller adult males appear to achieve higher output in the kharif season;
higher BMI of adult males is associated with higher output in kharif and rabi.  These
effects, however, do not carry over to total crop output.  Age and Raven's test scores are
nonsignificant in all regressions, suggesting that experience and innate ability are not
important determinants of crop output in the survey areas once we control for schooling. 
Better-educated males obtain a lower crop output in the rabi season, but the effect of
schooling on total crop output is positive and marginally significant.  The effect vanishes,25
however, if only the education of the head of household is considered.  These results
suggest that schooling has an effect on crop output by causing household members to
neglect the drier rabi season, and not by raising productivity per se.  Family background
variables are in general nonsignificant.  Land owned by the head's father has a negative
effect on crop productivity, but this effect is significant only for one of the kharif
regressions.  Father's schooling is positively associated with rabi output, but only when the
head's own schooling is negatively significant.  Taken together, our results coincide with
evidence indicating that returns to schooling are low in Third World agriculture (for
example, Rosenzweig 1980; Jolliffe 1996), but contrast with conclusions reached by
Jamison and Lau (1982).
Because of the controversial nature of our findings regarding human capital, we
conduct an extensive sensitivity analysis.  First, we examine whether households with
more human capital respond more efficiently to market signals even though they may
produce the same output.  To do so, we replace total crop revenues as the dependent
variable with crop income net of variable costs.  Imputed labor costs are not included
because more than 90 percent of (nonharvest) crop labor is provided by the household. 
Since net crop income can be negative, the assumption of multiplicative errors in equation
(10) is replaced with additive errors and equation (10) is estimated via nonlinear least
squares.  Results (in Appendix Table 9) generally confirm previous results:  factors of
production have the expected sign and are highly significant, but schooling has no effect26
When household fixed effects are included, village fixed effects and household-level time-invariant
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variables such as family background are dropped.  Variations in average human capital from year to year
reflects variations in household composition more than anything else.
on net crop incomes.  High BMI among adult males has a highly significant positive effect
on net crop income.
Second, we investigate whether the nonsignificant effect of schooling is due to the
fact that the management gains from schooling are a household public good:  as long as a
single member of the household is educated, he or she can help the others make better
production decisions (for example, Jolliffe 1997).  To test this hypothesis, we replace
average schooling with the maximum education level attained by an adult male or female
member of the household.  Results (Appendix Table 10) do not change:  schooling either
has a negative (rabi) or nonsignificant (kharif, combined) effect on output.
Third, we reestimate crop output regressions with household random effects to
control for the possibility that household-specific disturbances correlated with human
capital blur the effect of human capital on output.  Results are qualitatively unaffected
(Appendix Table 11).  We repeat the exercise with household fixed effects; in this case,
none of the human capital variables are significant (Appendix Table 12).   Fourth, we
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reestimate equation (10) with instrumental variables, using the determinants of household
labor supply (see Section 5) as instruments.  These determinants include family
composition, owned land, livestock assets, and nonearned income.  The resulting
production function estimates (Appendix Table 13) tend to be smaller and less significant
for all factors of production, suggesting that our instruments, although highly significant,27
are not sufficiently precise.  Human capital variables are, in general, nonsignificant, except
for height of adult males for kharif.
Fifth, we investigate whether the reported effect of BMI on crop output may be due
to endogeneity bias—better harvest means more food available and hence better nutrition,
rather than the reverse causation of better nutrition leading to more work effort in crop
production.  To reduce the potential bias, we reestimate the crop production function with
lagged BMI, which implies losing one third of the observations.  Results (Appendix Table
14) show no significant relationship between lagged adult BMI and crop output.  This
suggests that endogeneity bias may be responsible for the spurious correlation between
BMI and crop output reported in Table 3.  Schooling is negatively significant for rabi,
nonsignificant otherwise.  Sixth, we investigate whether human capital is nonneutral in the
sense that it raises the effectiveness of certain inputs more than others.  To do so, we
reestimate equation (10) with interaction terms between essential inputs and key human
capital variables.  Results (Appendix Table 15) do not invalidate previous results. In the
rabi season, male schooling is shown to raise the efficiency of land but to decrease total
productivity even more, so that the total effect is negative, as in Table 3.  Annual crop
output is not affected by male schooling.
Finally, it is possible that our estimates of the productivity of human capital are
biased because certain individual traits that correlate positively with output are correlated
negatively with education or nutrition.  To understand why, suppose, for instance, that




ways that are hard to measure, for example, by planting or irrigating late, supervising labor
less effectively, and in general applying less care to their fields.  If better educated males
are more involved in nonfarm activities, an omitted variable bias may arise that tends to
depress the estimated effect of schooling on crop productivity.  To correct this bias, we
use the labor allocation regressions to identify the omitted variable and control for its
effect on productivity.  The idea behind the correction mechanism is that households who
neglect farming because they are heavily involved in livestock or nonfarm activities have
large positive residuals in the labor allocation regressions (see Section 5).  These residuals
can be included in equation (10) to identify the effect of unobserved productivity in
nonfarm and livestock activities on crop output, after correction for the fact that labor is a
censored variable.  The approach is similar in spirit to the use of the inverse Mills ratio to
control for self-selection bias (for example, Heckman 1976; Maddala 1983), except that
the selection equation is a tobit, not a probit.  This parallels work by Pitt, Rosenzweig, and
Hassan (1990), who use residuals from a health production function in their analysis of
intrahousehold food distribution, and Behrman, Birdsall, and Deolalikar (1995) in their
analysis of marriage market outcomes in India.
Formally, let   denote the ith observation of the dependent variable and the
ith residual in any of the income equations, respectively.  Similarly, let   denote
the dependent variable and the residuals in the tobit labor choice equation, respectively. 
The regressors in the   are denoted x and w, respectively.  The residuals are i    iE[yi | xi,ui] ’ $Nxi % E[,i | ui]




























assumed to be normally distributed.  Their standard deviations are written 
respectively; D is the correlation coefficient between the two.  In case z > 0, we have i
In case z = 0, we get i
which, by application of Theorem 20.4 in Greene (1997, 975), is equivalent to
where N(.) and M(.) denote the probability function and cumulative distribution function
of a standard normal variable.  All production and income regressions are reestimated with
selection/effort correction terms constructed by replacing u, F , N(.), and M(.) in i   u







Two selection/effort correction terms are constructed, one for livestock and one for
nonfarm labor.
Results (Appendix Table 16) are virtually identical to those reported in Table 3,
except that schooling is no longer significant in the total crop output regression.  Other
human capital results are essentially unchanged.  As anticipated, nonfarm residuals are
negative in all regression, suggesting that households who invest more labor in nonfarm
work than predicted by the labor choice regression spend less "quality time" in their fields. 
The effect is significant only in one of the kharif regressions, however.
LIVESTOCK, NONFARM, AND TOTAL INCOME
We now turn to the household's noncrop activities.  A production function is
estimated for livestock.  Essential inputs into livestock production are livestock itself and
labor.  Different categories of livestock are aggregated using the same approximation used
for crop land, that is, the contribution of livestock to output is decomposed into a size
effect—the number of animals—and a herd composition effect,    where N is the i
number of animals in category i, N is total livestock, and $ is a parameter to be estimated.  i
Land is treated as a nonessential input since households can purchase fodder from the
market.  Land is, however, expected to raise the productivity of livestock thanks to better
and cheaper access to crop residues and fodder (see Fafchamps and Kurosaki 1997 for
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In an attempt to construct a more comprehensive measure of nonfarm capital, we also compute an
16
alternative measure of nonfarm capital as the sum of inventories plus the value of durables such as vehicles,
refrigerators, and sewing machines, which are known to serve as the basis for numerous nonfarm businesses
in rural Pakistan.  Because household durables are also consumption goods, however, this measure is subject
to the risk of spurious correlation with income.  Results using this alternative measure of nonfarm capital must
thus be interpreted with extreme caution.
(14)
(15)
where   denote total and irrigated owned land, respectively.  The labor
supervision term is ignored since all herding is performed by household members.
Livestock income Y  is net of production costs and capital losses.  Some 21 percent of b
livestock income observations are negative as a result of animal losses due to theft or
disease.  Postulating multiplicative errors is thus inappropriate.  Instead, we postulate
additive disturbances , and estimate equation (14) via nonlinear least squares. 
Households with no livestock are excluded from the regression.  The same 12 categories
of human capital variables are used as in the crop regressions.
Background variables are included to minimize omitted variable bias.  An equivalent
production function is estimated for nonfarm production.  To approximate nonfarm
capital, we use data on trading inventories. The estimated equation is thus
where K denotes nonfarm inventories.   Nonfarm income Y  is net of production costs. 
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n
To control for the possibility that returns to human capital may differ in farm and nonfarm32
labor, the negligible amounts of off-farm agricultural wages and labor recorded in the data
are excluded from Y  and L .  Since 22 percent of nonfarm income observations are null or n    n
negative, we again postulate additive errors , and estimate equation (15) using nonlinear
least squares.
We also estimate a total net income regression of a form similar to the forms of
equations (14) and (15).  It includes all semi-fixed assets such as owned land, farm tools,
livestock, and nonfarm capital.  Total labor is included as well as the share of labor
devoted to crops and livestock.  Since total income can be negative, equation (15) is
estimated with nonlinear least squares.  Year and village fixed effects are included.
Estimation results for livestock, nonfarm, and total income are summarized in Table
4.  Village fixed effects are included in the regression but omitted from the table.  Factors
of production are in general significant and have the right sign in all regressions, except for
trading inventories (a proxy for nonfarm capital), which has a negative and significant sign
in the total income regression.  Many share parameters are significant as well, suggesting
the presence of heterogeneity among inputs. Bullocks are significantly more productive
than cattle; sheep and goats, less productive.  Year and village dummies often are
significant, again emphasizing the existence of systematic income differences across space
and time.
Regarding human capital, the strongest result concerns the effect of male education
on nonfarm and total income:  it is positive in all four regressions and highly significant in
three.  One additional year of education is associated with an increase of 2.8 to 4.6 3
3
Table 4—Livestock, nonfarm, and total income regressions
               Livestock net income                            Nonfarm net earned income             
                  Total earned income                 
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Total labor 0.026 2.363 0.044 3.492 0.590 22.225 0.609 18.902 0.101 2.965 0.202 6.098
Share of crop labor –0.098 –0.877 –0.321 –3.600
Share of livestock labor –0.050 –0.541 –0.876 –8.535
Number of livestock 0.903 16.645 0.841 13.203 0.344 7.109 0.200 4.857
Share of bullocks 0.806 5.782 0.768 4.797 –0.316 –1.105 0.557 2.592
Share of buffaloes –0.061 –0.190 0.312 0.999 –0.534 –5.237 0.298 3.326
Share of donkeys –0.516 –1.255 –1.133 –2.214 0.263 0.796 –0.531 –1.671
Share of sheep and goats –0.417 –2.808 –0.513 –3.030 –0.876 –6.815 –0.216 –2.012
Total land –0.174 –4.827 –0.092 –2.220 0.182 5.312 0.038 1.085
a
Share of irrigated land 0.106 1.124 –0.195 –1.824 –0.164 –1.766 0.188 2.274
a
Value of farm tools 0.093 5.610 0.080 5.586
Trading inventories 0.011 3.020 0.001 0.119 –0.033 –4.428 0.011 1.649
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.031 –1.510 0.047 1.972 –0.002 –0.175 –0.032 –2.156 0.021 0.976 –0.018 –1.112
Age squared 0.000 1.706 –0.000 –2.165 –0.000 –0.393 0.000 1.951 –0.001 –1.948 0.000 1.093
Years of education 0.009 0.896 0.018 1.632 0.028 4.442 0.046 7.381 0.089 10.116 0.004 0.563
Raven's test score –0.008 –1.566 –0.012 –2.216 0.006 1.665 0.002 0.547 0.009 1.860 0.009 2.282
Height 0.022 4.039 0.018 3.436 –0.005 –1.700 –0.005 –1.409 0.025 4.941 –0.001 –0.321
BMI 0.045 4.298 0.025 2.309 0.005 0.913 –0.007 –1.218 0.034 3.292 0.012 1.705
Adult females
Age –0.009 –0.456 0.028 1.273 –0.026 –2.107 –0.013 –0.888 –0.033 –1.523 –0.004 –0.222
Age squared 0.000 0.416 –0.000 –0.777 0.000 1.561 0.000 1.783 0.000 0.837 0.000 0.858
Years of education –0.077 –2.495 0.001 0.028 –0.016 –1.442 –0.008 –0.488 –0.006 –0.382 0.036 2.321
Raven's test score –0.000 –0.058 0.007 1.026 0.002 0.644 –0.002 –0.408 0.044 6.833 0.007 1.326
Height 0.019 3.433 0.009 1.550 –0.001 –0.259 –0.003 –0.970 –0.042 –8.617 –0.003 –0.670
BMI 0.016 1.990 0.008 1.141 0.018 3.994 0.007 1.704 0.061 8.827 0.003 0.487
Family background
Father's holding (log+1) –0.005 –2.186 –0.002 –0.724 0.000 0.477 –0.004 –3.090 –0.001 –0.803 0.002 1.444
Inherited land (log+1) 0.004 1.158 0.003 1.024 0.002 1.618 0.006 2.984 0.002 0.902 0.003 1.454
Father's education –0.110 –3.467 –0.161 –3.956 –0.013 –0.739 –0.002 –0.096 –0.045 –2.038 0.108 4.680
Mother's education 1.266 9.043 0.910 5.540 0.195 3.506 0.110 1.554 0.185 1.805 –0.204 –1.647
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.021 –0.268 –0.029 –0.328 0.111 2.896 0.114 2.557 –0.424 –6.356 –0.067 –1.059
Dummy for 1987 0.172 2.212 0.176 2.061 0.096 2.514 0.133 2.986 –0.344 –5.540 0.064 1.106
Intercept 0.000 0.705 0.000 0.729 0.862 1.198 2.557 1.185 1.403 0.742 2.191 0.922
Number of observations 1,303 1,016 1,451 1,143 1,392 1,095
R-squared 0.396 0.419 0.638 0.653 0.685 0.539
Notes:  Estimator is nonlinear least squares.  Village fixed effects included but not shown.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is
computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.
 In the livestock regression, land is cultivated acreage; in the total earned income equation, land is owned acreage.
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percent in nonfarm earned income.  An additional year of schooling is also estimated to
raise total income by 8.9 percent, if average human capital is used as a regressor, but by
0.4 percent if only the education of the head of household is used.  Female education is
significant and positive in the total income regressions, which show it increasing total
income by 3.6 percent.  But female education is not significant or negative in other
regressions, suggesting that the coefficient estimate may be subject to omitted variable
bias.  Male and female height and BMI are significant and positive in several of the
regressions, suggesting that better-fed households achieve higher incomes.  To summarize,
production regressions indicate that male education has a strong positive effect on
nonfarm and total income, but no or little effect on crop output.  Better-fed households in
general achieve higher incomes, but the effect is not present in all regressions, and may
reflect endogeneity of BMI.  Experience, innate ability, and female education do not
appear to have any robust effect on incomes.
5. HUMAN CAPITAL AND LABOR USE
We now examine how human capital affects labor used in four activities:  kharif and
rabi crop production, herding, and nonfarm work.  We also examine total family labor
supply.  The labor and input use equations,
andX
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Jacoby (1993) uses a different approach and derives shadow wages from marginal products estimated
17
from a farm production function.
(16)
discussed in Section 2, form the basis of our estimation strategy.  Since the shadow cost of
labor w  is not observable, we include factors that influence total labor supply when
*
markets are imperfect, namely household size and composition, nonearned income, family
background, and productive assets in other activities.   For kharif and rabi, the dependent
17
variable L  is the sum of family and hired labor.  In the case of herding and off-farm work, a
it consists exclusively of family labor since the hiring of labor by the household was not
observed in these activities.  Around 37 percent of kharif and rabi labor observations are
zeroes; the corresponding percentages for herding and off-farm work are 45 percent and
38 percent, respectively.  The dependent variable is thus a censored variable.  Latent labor
use   is assumed to follow:
for a = {k, r, h, n}, with actual labor   if L  > 0.  A similar equation is assumed to a
represent latent labor supply,    The 2's are parameters to be estimated and










The categories are adult males and adult females aged 20 to 65; children aged 0-5; youth aged 6-19;
18
and the elderly 66 and above.
Shares variables are set to zero whenever their denominator is zero.
19
These tobit results can be found in Appendix Tables 17 and 18.
20
number of household members in different age/sex categories and  .   As
18
with other share variables, the parameters of each of the age/sex categories indicate the
efficiency of that category relative to the excluded category, adult males.  O is total owned
land; O is owned irrigated land; T is farm tools; B  is the total number of livestock in I                  c
category c and  ; S  stands for the three categories of unearned income:  u
remittances, rental income, and pensions, with  ; and unearned income is
expected to have a negative effect on labor supply.   Z, as before, denotes a vector of
19
human capital variables and family background variables.  We focus our discussion on
specifications without reported illness days, given the caveats regarding self-reported
illness.  Year and village fixed effects are included to control for location and year-specific
changes in climatic and market environments.
We first estimated equation (16) for each labor use category and for total labor in
log form using the tobit model.  We also estimated equation (16) with the human capital
of husband and wife instead of the family average.   However, the appropriateness of a
20
tobit model for analyzing labor allocation decisions is conditional on the assumption that
the variables affecting the decision to participate in an activity also affect the number of
hours worked, conditional on participation.  To see why, let us rewrite equation (16) more
compactly asl
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where   is the log of   for household i, ,i is a standard normal variable, and $ and
x are vectors of parameters and explanatory variables, respectively.  In tobit estimation, i
the dependent variable l is assumed to depend on the value of the underlying latent i
variable according to the following rule:  if   is greater than zero, we observe  ;
otherwise, l = 0.  As Cragg (1971) and Lin and Schmidt (1984) point out, it is i
nevertheless possible that the decision to work may be determined differently from days
worked conditional on participation, so that
while
The tobit model is a special case of the above where  .  A likelihood ratio test of
the restriction implicit in the tobit model was proposed by Greene (1997, 970).  It involves
subtracting the sum of the log-likelihoods of the probit and truncated regressions from the
tobit log-likelihood.  Using this approach, we test in each labor use regression, equation
(17), the null hypothesis that  .  Except for total labor, likelihood ratio test results
are all above 1,000, well above the   critical values with 35 degrees of freedom that are
49.52 and 56.53 at the 5 percent and 1 percent level of significance, respectively.  The
simple tobit model is thus inappropriate except for total labor.  The decision to participate38
We experienced difficulties estimating the corresponding maximum likelihood estimator due to the
21
presence of a large number of village fixed effects.
in a particular activity appears different from the decision of how much labor to allocate to
that activity, given participation.  These results are consistent with threshold effects
created by fixed costs:  if households must incur certain costs up front before initiating a
particular income generating activity, the decision to undertake that activity will differ
from that of how much labor to allocate to it conditional on having undertaken it.
We therefore estimate the labor use equation separately from the decision to
undertake a particular activity. We apply the two-step Heckman estimator used for
selection models (see Maddala 1983; Greene 1997 for details).   Year and village fixed
21
effects are included but not shown.  Family background variables—father's landholdings,
inherited land, and father's and mother's education—are used as identifying restrictions. 
They are preferable to unearned income since rents, pensions, and remittances may be
influenced by past labor supply or asset accumulation decisions.  Given that virtually all
households have some kind of market-oriented activity, the selection issue does not arise
in the case of total family labor.  Estimates are reported in Table 5 for crop labor and in
Table 6 for herding, nonfarm, and total labor.  Similar results are obtained for the human
capital of husband and wife but are not reported for the sake of brevity.  F stands for the
estimated standard deviation of the residuals in the labor equation; D is the estimated
correlation coefficient between the residuals in the selection and labor equations.39
For crop labor (Table 5), household size is not a significant determinant of whether
the household farms in either season, but it has a paramount influence on the amount of
labor allocated to crop production, hence providing additional evidence against the
existence of perfect labor markets.  If factor markets were complete, production decisions
should be separable from household characteristics affecting total labor supply (for
example, Benjamin 1992).  Household demographic composition is also significant in all of
the regressions; estimated coefficients show that persons in all age/sex categories,
conditional on participation, supply less labor than adult males.  This result is in full
agreement with the dominant role that adult males play in all market-oriented activities
(see Section 3).  Elderly households are less likely to farm, a reminder that crop work is
strenuous and taxing.  In contrast, ownership of bullocks affects the decision to farm, but
not labor use.  This again is consistent with imperfect factor markets.  Indeed, one would
expect households who do not own their own draft animals to be reluctant to engage in
crop production if rental markets for draft animals are imperfect and unreliable (for
example, Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993).  Ownership of bullocks thus appears a sunk cost
required for successful farming.  Education of adult males has a negative effect on the
decision to farm during the drier rabi season, and an additional negative effect on labor use
in both seasons; these results indicate that better educated males opt out of farming.
Turning to herding and nonfarm work (Table 6), we see that larger households
spend more time in herding and nonfarm activities and are more likely to engage in 40
Table 5—Estimation of crop labor use with selection correction
                    Kharif labor                                            Rabi labor                      
       Selection          Days worked            Selection           Days worked    
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Household composition
Household size (log) 0.242 1.414 0.484 5.058 0.030 0.178 0.424 4.828 
Adult females (share) –1.227 –1.558 –0.482 –1.087 –0.948 –1.195 –0.874 –2.128 
Children (share) –1.106 –1.897 –0.825 –2.515 –0.484 –0.836 –1.172 –3.908 
Young (share) –1.050 –1.947 –0.566 –1.961 –0.336 –0.625 –0.535 –2.011 
Old(share) –3.269 –3.292 –1.238 –2.354 –1.981 –2.033 –2.124 –4.396 
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.065 –1.514 –0.006 –0.241 –0.053 –1.241 –0.032 –1.452 
Age squared 0.001 1.294 0.000 0.187 0.001 1.204 0.000 1.400 
Years of education –0.021 –1.060 –0.023 –2.252 –0.034 –1.765 –0.021 –2.276 
Raven's test score –0.003 –0.286 0.003 0.642 0.003 0.308 –0.005 –0.948 
Height 0.006 0.680 –0.003 –0.519 0.018 1.950 0.010 2.128 
BMI 0.007 0.390 –0.015 –1.364 –0.000 –0.008 0.001 0.126 
Adult females
Age 0.058 1.333 –0.015 –0.603 0.022 0.513 –0.025 –1.129 
Age squared –0.001 –1.451 0.000 0.693 –0.000 –0.790 0.000 1.112 
Years of education –0.061 –1.689 –0.047 –2.098 –0.088 –2.417 –0.010 –0.469 
Raven's test score 0.037 2.835 –0.005 –0.725 0.027 2.088 –0.007 –1.163 
Height –0.000 –0.015 –0.001 –0.123 –0.002 –0.248 0.001 0.160 
BMI 0.004 0.258 0.001 0.111 0.020 1.246 –0.014 –1.698 
Factors and inputs
Total owned land (log+1) 0.346 4.167 0.010 0.294 0.249 3.042 0.077 2.512 
Share of irrigated land 0.182 0.973 0.149 1.517 0.354 1.883 0.005 0.057 
Value of farm tools (log+1) 0.124 3.638 0.087 3.701 0.168 5.008 0.049 2.284 
Number of livestock (log+1) 0.572 6.952 0.345 6.856 0.596 7.194 0.340 7.531 
Share of buffaloes 0.136 0.734 –0.238 –2.088 –0.051 –0.282 –0.038 –0.354 
Share of bullocks 2.297 3.288 0.060 0.211 1.075 1.783 0.183 0.699 
Share of donkeys –0.960 –1.788 0.012 0.028 –0.069 –0.139 –0.397 –1.169 
Share of sheep and goats –0.575 –3.108 –0.612 –4.910 –0.568 –3.107 –0.221 –1.933 
Nonfarm capital –0.028 –1.776 0.001 0.126 –0.043 –2.868 0.015 1.536 
Family background
Father's holding (log+1) 0.180 2.383 0.141 1.917
Inherited land (log+1) –0.129 –1.362 –0.040 –0.422
Father's education –0.098 –1.730 –0.080 –1.396
Mother's education –0.131 –0.648 0.001 0.004
Nonearned income
Total unearned (log+1) –0.064 –3.973 –0.029 –3.319 –0.033 –2.053 –0.006 –0.797 
Share of rental income –0.737 –4.366 –0.077 –0.788 –0.845 –5.034 –0.218 –2.467 
Share of pension income 0.605 1.928 0.040 0.211 0.029 0.094 0.087 0.496 
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 0.334 2.444 0.436 5.232 0.106 0.772 0.021 0.282 
Dummy for 1987 –0.540 –4.113 –0.870 –10.455 –0.343 –2.587 –0.061 –0.822 
Intercept –1.014 –0.424 3.987 2.851 –2.724 –1.116 3.072 2.393 
Selection terms
Tan(Rho * Pi/2) 0.347 3.369 –0.095 .
Log(Sigma) –0.169 –6.205 –0.240 –10.412
Rho 0.333 –0.095
Sigma 0.845 0.787
Number of observations 1,385 1,385
Log-likelihood –1711.6 –1652.1
Notes:  Estimator is two-step Heckman procedure.  Village fixed effects included but not shown.  Human capital variables are household
averages.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t
and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.4
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Table 6—Estimation of livestock and nonfarm labor use with selection correction
                          Herding labor                                                    Nonfarm labor                                    Total labor        
          Selection                 Days worked                   Selection                  Days worked               Days worked       
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Household composition
Household size (log) –0.011 –0.085 0.360 3.146 0.798 5.829 0.522 6.356 0.835 9.323
Adult females (share) –1.520 –2.407 –1.889 –3.240 –0.425 –0.680 –1.368 –3.535 –1.441 –3.447
Children (share) –1.285 –2.734 –1.490 –3.162 –1.040 –2.215 –1.348 –4.764 –1.746 –5.651
Young (share) –0.457 –1.071 –1.039 –3.035 –0.951 –2.284 –0.882 –3.403 –1.088 –3.930
Old(share) –1.746 –2.261 –1.808 –2.711 –1.355 –1.796 –1.074 –2.247 –2.168 –4.316
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.022 –0.630 –0.022 –0.791 –0.021 –0.625 –0.021 –1.020 –0.024 –1.076
Age squared 0.000 0.844 0.000 0.832 0.000 0.378 0.000 1.111 0.000 1.145
Years of education –0.033 –2.071 0.000 0.007 0.029 1.958 0.006 0.669 0.009 0.860
Raven's test score –0.005 –0.677 –0.009 –1.371 0.008 0.985 –0.011 –2.162 –0.001 –0.268
Height 0.013 1.717 0.002 0.260 0.007 0.916 0.008 1.690 0.012 2.409
BMI 0.003 0.186 –0.010 –0.799 0.043 2.746 0.010 1.065 0.010 0.963
Adult females
Age –0.002 –0.055 –0.016 –0.598 –0.063 –1.874 –0.002 –0.086 –0.027 –1.206
Age squared –0.000 –0.236 0.000 0.389 0.001 1.881 0.000 0.258 0.000 1.042
Years of education –0.006 –0.189 –0.013 –0.517 –0.068 –2.156 0.029 1.658 –0.072 –3.425
Raven's test score –0.007 –0.726 0.005 0.643 0.001 0.147 –0.011 –1.823 –0.004 –0.633
Height –0.002 –0.297 0.007 1.068 –0.003 –0.425 –0.001 –0.183 –0.002 –0.363
BMI –0.014 –1.136 0.005 0.443 –0.001 –0.083 –0.020 –2.650 –0.013 –1.622
Factors and inputs
Total owned land (log+1) 0.089 1.460 –0.046 –1.160 –0.070 –1.236 0.073 2.576 0.016 0.391
Share of irrigated land –0.053 –0.362 0.192 1.713 0.033 0.237 –0.400 –4.689 –0.074 –0.784
Value of farm tools (log+1) –0.035 –1.267 –0.017 –0.663 –0.064 –2.178 0.000 0.024 0.009 0.486
Number of livestock (log+1) 0.495 7.359 0.396 3.588 –0.413 –6.033 –0.094 –2.324 0.165 3.730
Share of buffaloes 0.386 2.514 –0.106 –0.678 –0.096 –0.625 –0.058 –0.617 0.033 0.324
Share of bullocks 0.527 1.308 0.947 2.549 –0.063 –0.154 0.048 0.188 0.120 0.422
Share of donkeys 0.400 0.848 0.215 0.564 0.509 1.131 0.095 0.339 0.215 0.681
Share of sheep and goats –0.162 –1.037 –0.363 –2.637 0.613 3.665 0.128 1.373 –0.056 –0.534
Nonfarm capital –0.025 –1.827 –0.004 –0.335 0.028 1.932 0.036 4.655 0.022 2.445
Family background
Father's holding (log+1) 0.009 0.158 –0.046 –0.969 0.004 0.117
Inherited land (log+1) –0.024 –0.339 –0.069 –1.235 –0.045 –1.044
Father's education –0.097 –1.929 0.085 1.940 –0.039 –1.244
Mother's education –0.097 –0.418 0.105 0.505 0.364 2.718
Nonearned income
Total unearned (log+1) –0.000 –0.030 –0.031 –3.243 –0.044 –3.589 –0.024 –3.216 –0.046 –5.646
Share of rental income 0.103 0.765 0.179 1.705 0.207 1.552 0.148 1.792 0.001 0.010
Share of pension income –0.214 –0.796 0.417 1.901 0.237 0.830 0.107 0.713 0.156 0.885
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 0.681 5.825 –0.857 –6.105 0.136 1.194 0.056 0.811 0.153 2.013
Dummy for 1987 0.412 3.791 –0.933 –8.374 0.174 1.558 0.227 3.434 –0.152 –2.069
Intercept 0.177 0.089 5.404 3.267 0.427 0.213 5.637 4.594 4.713 3.569
Selection terms
Tan(Rho * Pi/2) 0.031 0.066 –1.040 .
Log(Sigma) –0.190 –6.876 –0.291 –13.616
Rho 0.031 –0.778
Sigma 0.827 0.748 0.936
Number of observations 1385 1385 1385
Log-likelihood –1662.3 –1744.4 0.112
a
Notes: Except for total labor, estimator is two-step Heckman procedure.  Tobit is used for total labor.  Village fixed effects included but not shown.  Human capital variables are household
averages.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10
percent level or better.
 Pseudo R-square.
a42
Strictly speaking, Tables 5 and 6 estimate labor demand regressions.  Since there is no hired labor
22
in herding and nonfarm work, however, labor demand and supply are identical.  There is a small difference
between family labor and total labor use in crop activities due to hired labor, but hired laborers account for
such a small proportion of total cultivation labor that the results obtained using family labor supply instead
of total labor use are virtually identical to those in Table 5.
nonfarm work.  This latter result is in line with income diversification strategies for risk
smoothing:  as the household adds members, it diversifies its income base (for example,
Binswanger and McIntire 1987; Bromley and Chavas 1989).  There is also evidence that
herding competes with crop work for household manpower.  Unearned income has a
negative coefficient on the probability of undertaking kharif and rabi labor, and decreases
the number of days in herding and nonfarm work.  These results indicate that leisure (and,
possibly, unobserved home services) is a normal good. In contrast, factors of production
have a positive effect on labor supply :  households with more land and livestock work
22
less off the farm.  This constitutes further evidence that factor markets are incomplete.
Males with a higher BMI are also more likely to work in the nonfarm sector,
although higher BMI does not affect days worked.  However, the selection of nonfarm
work by higher BMI males may reflect lower energy intensity in that activity than in
farmwork (Higgins and Alderman 1997).  Taller males are more likely to herd, and are
more likely to work in the nonfarm sector.  Both results are consistent with the higher
productivity achieved by better-fed males in nonfarm work and by taller men in herding
(see Section 4).  Together, these results indicate that nutrition has an effect on43
This result is to be compared with that of Foster and Rosenzweig (1993) who find a positive and
23
significant effect of calorie consumption on piece-rate harvest wages.  In a later paper, Foster and Rosenzweig
(1996) examine worker selection of piece-rate and time-wage contracts and find that more productive workers
are likely to select piece-rate contracts.
productivity and that rural households adjust their labor allocation accordingly.   It is
23
remarkable that returns to nutrition, like those on education, are highest in nonfarm
activities; households with better educated males are less likely to herd, but are more likely
to work in nonfarm activities.
Unlike the robust results regarding the human capital of adult males, those
concerning females are quite sensitive to model specification.  Given the very little
amounts of recorded labor provided to crops, herding, or nonfarm work by female
members of the household, we interpret the lack of robustness as indicative of omitted
variable bias and discount the results accordingly.  Better-educated females are less likely
to work in the farm and nonfarm sectors, although, conditional on participation, better
educated females provide more time in nonfarm work.  The number of females
participating in nonfarm work, however, is very low.  Better-fed women also work less
during the rabi season, and work less in the nonfarm sector.  Given the marginal role that
women play in market work (for example, Brown and Haddad 1995; Alderman and
Chishti 1991; and Section 3), female human capital variables probably capture wealth
effects in a country where social prestige is attached to observing female seclusion or
purdah (for example, Jefferey 1979; Darling 1925).  Wealthy families are more likely to








These numbers are computed using the fact that E[L] = E[L|L > 0] Prob[L > 0] and, thus, that
24
M E[L|L > 0]/M X is computed from estimated coefficients using E[L|L > 0]  M E[log(L)|L > 0]/M X.
these families can afford to lose an additional wage earner.  Another possibility is that
wealthier households educate their daughters better.
All in all, higher education of adult males is associated with less herding and
farmwork in both kharif and rabi seasons, but more nonfarm labor.  This effect is fairly
strong:  one additional year of schooling leads to 3.3 percent, 3.4 percent, and 2.4 percent
less work in kharif, rabi, and herding, respectively, and to 2.0 percent more labor off the
farm.   There is, therefore, agreement between the labor allocation and the productivity
24
regressions discussed in Section 4:  better-educated males are more productive in nonfarm
work; they respond to this by reallocating their time away from less productive to more
productive activities.  The net effect of this reallocation on total family labor is
nonsignificant.
Further evidence that better-educated households opt out of farming can be found
by observing how cultivated acreage and expenditures on variable inputs vary across
households.  Tobit regression results are presented in Table 7.  They confirm that better-
schooled households put significantly less emphasis on farming.  Long-term nutrition as
measured by height is positively associated with crop production:  taller individuals put 45
Table 7—Tobit regression on crop expenditures and cultivated acreage
    Expenditures on variable inputs                Cultivated acreage                     
   Kharif season        Rabi season        Kharif season         Rabi season    
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Household composition
Household size (log) –0.012 –0.047 0.299 0.941 0.142 1.585 0.172 2.044
Adult females (share) –1.687 –1.386 –2.828 –1.899 –0.631 –1.531 –0.334 –0.853
Children (share) –1.121 –1.245 –1.563 –1.422 –0.638 –2.108 –0.518 –1.807
Young (share) –1.221 –1.515 –1.873 –1.906 –0.665 –2.479 –0.230 –0.910
Old(share) –3.292 –2.224 –3.968 –2.197 –0.086 –0.180 –0.100 –0.220
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.026 –0.393 0.078 0.963 –0.029 –1.326 –0.026 –1.232
Age squared 0.000 0.183 –0.001 –0.937 0.000 1.415 0.000 1.352
Years of education –0.041 –1.358 –0.084 –2.301 –0.019 –1.873 –0.034 –3.628
Raven's test score 0.001 0.072 0.004 0.203 0.002 0.406 0.003 0.684
Height 0.024 1.688 0.056 3.208 0.011 2.220 0.017 3.685
BMI 0.029 0.964 0.011 0.293 –0.002 –0.200 0.008 0.830
Adult females
Age 0.054 0.807 0.023 0.282 0.003 0.124 –0.016 –0.751
Age squared –0.001 –0.935 –0.000 –0.460 –0.000 –0.235 0.000 0.579
Years of education –0.048 –0.768 –0.031 –0.406 –0.021 –0.930 –0.017 –0.810
Raven's test score 0.081 4.229 0.047 1.991 0.001 0.143 –0.003 –0.534
Height –0.000 –0.006 0.002 0.095 –0.001 –0.142 0.001 0.247
BMI 0.045 1.848 0.006 0.202 0.000 0.010 0.010 1.246
Factors and inputs
Total owned land (log+1) 0.319 2.735 0.471 3.308 0.182 4.804 0.148 4.175
Share of irrigated land 1.031 3.769 1.442 4.336 –0.334 –3.635 –0.259 –2.967
Value of farm tools (log+1) 0.544 9.373 0.684 9.630 0.110 4.822 0.116 5.424
Number of livestock (log+1) 1.369 10.526 1.379 8.703 0.242 5.163 0.233 5.361
Share of buffaloes 0.498 1.660 0.428 1.166 –0.204 –1.960 –0.141 –1.414
Share of bullocks 2.298 2.862 1.158 1.182 –0.458 –1.841 0.002 0.010
Share of donkeys –1.112 –1.161 –0.003 –0.002 –0.468 –0.963 0.000 0.001
Share of sheep and goats –1.388 –4.317 –1.016 –2.605 –0.428 –3.554 –0.304 –2.761
Nonfarm capital 0.008 0.224 0.045 1.049 –0.028 –2.246 –0.004 –0.326
Share of shop inventory –2.097 –4.984 –2.346 –4.561 0.137 0.832 0.010 0.063
Family background
Father's holding (log+1) 0.301 2.882 0.314 2.471 0.015 0.458 0.009 0.293
Inherited land (log+1) 0.117 0.922 0.023 0.149 0.027 0.700 0.041 1.094
Father's education –0.124 –1.332 –0.078 –0.683 –0.054 –1.705 –0.027 –0.863
Mother's education 0.811 2.095 0.572 1.205 –0.076 –0.512 0.164 1.128
Nonearned income
Total unearned (log+1) –0.059 –2.502 –0.052 –1.800 –0.006 –0.714 –0.009 –1.240
Share of rental income –0.950 –3.598 –1.565 –4.852 –0.001 –0.016 –0.196 –2.296
Share of pension income 0.119 0.229 –0.881 –1.395 –0.346 –1.922 –0.155 –0.920
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.452 –2.026 –0.297 –1.097 0.003 0.042 –0.116 –1.599
Dummy for 1987 –0.307 –1.432 –0.823 –3.147 0.109 1.426 –0.019 –0.274
Intercept –8.065 –2.085 –14.652 –3.105 –1.068 –0.826 –3.069 –2.503
Selection-term 2.578 3.120 0.700 0.694
Number of observations 1338 1338 895 983
Censored 322 369 102 109
Noncensored 1016 969 793 874
Pseudo R-square 0.1791 0.1387 0.2473 0.2289
Notes:  Village fixed-effects included but not shown.  Household average human capital used.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1)
means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10























systematically more emphasis on crops.  This result is not surprising given that working in
the fields is a strenuous activity for which returns to physical strength are high.  Other
results of interest indicate that livestock ownership has a strong significant effect on the
use of variable inputs and on cultivated acreage, thereby suggesting that economies of
scope between livestock and crops exist in rural Pakistan.  Households with higher
nonearned (but nonrental) income spend less on variable inputs.  This suggests that credit
constraints are not a serious obstacle to expenditures on variable inputs.  Indeed, if most
households faced a binding liquidity constraint, households that received extra cash
through remittances and other nonearned income would spend more on variable inputs
than households that did not.  Households fortunate enough to have an external source of
income tend to deemphasize crop production.
Before we conclude, it is instructive to examine the influence that human capital has
on income, as predicted by estimated model parameters.  Human capital has two separate
effects: a direct productivity effect   which is the focus of much of the empirical
literature on human capital (for example, Jamison and Lau 1982), and an indirect labor
reallocation effect   which we have studied here (see also Jolliffe 1996).  The
combined contribution of human capital to total income is the sum of the two effects over
all the activities undertaken by the household: 47
This figure rises to 1.7 percent if simple tobit estimates are used instead of Heckman two-step
25
estimates.
Table 8 uses equation (18) to construct estimates of the contribution to income of one
additional year of schooling for all the adult males of the household.  The labor
reallocation effect is computed using the formula given in footnote (25).  Results illustrate
the paramount role played by labor reallocation:  without it, one extra year of schooling
for all adult males in the household raises annual income by 1.4 percent, an already
remarkable figure.   Combined with a reallocation of labor away from low productivity
25
farming to high productivity nonfarm work raises income by an additional 0.4 percent.  In
other words, one-fifth of the contribution of human capital to income happens through
labor reallocation, a phenomenon that until now has received very little attention.  In
nonfarm income alone, the labor reallocation effect is stronger:  one-third of the increase
in nonfarm income due to better education results from households shifting labor
resources away from farming.  In contrast, the total labor supply effect is quite small:  as
shown in Table 8, increased labor supply in response to higher marginal return to labor
thanks to schooling raises total income by only 0.1 percent, compared to a direct effect of
8.9 percent.  Most of the labor allocation effect on income is thus due to a pure
reallocation among competing activities, not to an increase in family labor supply. 48
Table 8—Predicted effect of male education on earned income
Kharif Rabi Livestock Off-farm Total (1) Total (2)
In percentages
Productivity effect 1.1% –2.2% 0.9% 2.8% 1.4%
Share of labor in activity 19.0% 0.0% 2.6% 59.0%
Labor use –4.2% –4.6% –7.2% 7.6%
Labor allocation effect –0.8% 0.0% –0.2% 4.5% 1.7%
Combined production and labor
allocation effect 0.3% –2.2% 0.7% 7.3% 3.1% 8.9%
Share of labor in total income 10.1%
Labor supply 0.9%
Labor supply effect 0.1%
Total with labor supply effect 9.0%
In absolute terms
Average net income 4,702 2,653 4,565 9,110 21,029 21,029
Productivity effect on income 52 –58 41 255 290
Labor allocation effect on income –38 0 –9 408 362
Total production and labor
allocation effect 14 –58 33 664 652 1,872
Labor supply effect 19
Total with labor supply effect 1,891
Notes: Total (1) is computed by aggregating over the four income sources listed in columns 1 to 4 and
computing percentages from the 'absolute terms' part of the table.  Total (2) is computed directly
from the total income and family labor supply regressions.  The two need not agree.49
It can be argued, however, that there are social gains to female education (for example, Subbarao and
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Raney 1995) even in countries with low female labor-force participation.  These gains occur through
reductions in infant mortality and fertility associated with increases in female education.  A recent study for
Pakistan shows that these externalities can be considerable:  an additional year of school for 1,000 women,
at an estimated cost of US$30,000, would increase wages by 20 percent and prevent 60 child deaths, 500
births, and three maternal deaths (Summers 1992).
6.  CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have examined how various facets of human capital affect the
productivity of rural households in Pakistan.  We showed that human capital can be
analyzed not only through its direct effects on output and incomes, but also via its indirect
effects on labor allocation.  Results indicate that education raises off-farm productivity and
induces rural Pakistani households to shift labor resources from farm to off-farm activities. 
This effect is strong, robust, and demonstrated via both the direct and indirect methods. 
One additional year of schooling for all adult males raises household incomes by 4.5
percent.  One-fifth of this additional income is achieved by reallocating labor away from
farming and toward nonfarm work.  Because we have controlled for background
characteristics and innate ability, we can reasonably conclude that it is the skills acquired
in school that raise the productivity of adult males in rural nonfarm work, not their innate
intelligence or the wealth of their parents, with which education is often correlated.
Although wife's education does have a positive and significant effect on total
income, the effect of female human capital on productivity is not robust.  The beneficial
effect of education accrues mostly to males.  Using market-oriented activities as sole
criterion, female education seems to be a wasted investment in rural Pakistan.   This is
2650
Recent evidence nevertheless suggests that the gap has begun to close (World Bank 1996).
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hardly surprising, given that schooling raises labor productivity in activities that are
off-limits to women.  Purdah thus appears as the major culprit for low returns to female
education.  These low returns, in turn, probably explain the extreme gender gap that has
historically been found in Pakistani education (for example, World Bank 1996; Sawada
1997).   This suggests that removing barriers to women's participation in the labor force
27
could enable women to reap returns to their human capital and encourage parents to invest
more in girls' education, health, and nutrition.
Other dimensions of human capital such as better nutrition are important too. 
Height, a proxy for nutrition in childhood and adolescence, was shown to raise
productivity and labor effort in livestock production.  These effects are again confined to
male adults; no systematic and robust relationship was uncovered between female nutrition
and market-oriented activities in rural Pakistan.
Our analysis provides strong evidence against the perfect labor and factor market
hypothesis.  This stands in contrast to the work of Benjamin (1992) but agrees with other
empirical work (for example, Gavian and Fafchamps 1996; Udry 1996).  It is also in line
with much of the development literature in which incomplete markets are regarded as part
of the economic landscape in Third World rural communities (for example, de  Janvry
1981; Feder 1985; Eswaran and Kotwal 1986; Bardhan 1984; Basu 1997).
One may be tempted to see in our results a microeconomic justification for the
recent emphasis on human capital accumulation as an engine of growth (for example,51
Romer 1986, 1990; Lucas 1988).  Such interpretation is unwarranted.  Our analysis is a
partial equilibrium analysis that investigates how better nutrition and education raised
household income and affected labor allocation in rural Pakistan.  These results were
obtained in the context of a rural labor market with a very low supply of educated people
and a mediocre nutritional status in general.  In such an environment it is not surprising
that a few stronger and better skilled individuals prosper by providing a handful of goods
and services that require literacy and strength.  It would therefore be misleading to take
our partial equilibrium numbers and infer from them that the return to schooling at the
national level is as high as 9 percent.  With these words of caution, it is nevertheless
encouraging to find robust evidence that human capital helps households improve their
livelihood.APPENDIX
Table 9—Regression on total annual crop income net of variable input cost
Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors and inputs
Cultivated acreage 0.179 4.832 0.213 4.851
Cultivation labor 0.066 2.461 0.116 3.628
Value of farm tools 0.074 3.920 0.096 3.865
Number of bullocks 0.031 0.660 0.079 1.415
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.395 10.860 0.327 6.211
Share of family labor –0.001 –0.010 –0.181 –2.015
Share of irrigated land 1.257 6.094 0.710 2.337
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.016 –0.923 –0.048 –2.499
Age squared 0.000 0.728 0.000 2.655
Years of education –0.008 –1.033 0.006 0.603
Raven's test score 0.011 3.103 0.003 0.711
Height 0.003 0.774 –0.003 –0.706
BMI 0.037 4.329 0.039 4.424
Adult females
Age 0.029 1.680 0.062 2.921
Age squared –0.000 –1.239 –0.001 –3.013
Years of education 0.047 2.901 0.069 3.951
Raven's test score 0.012 2.111 0.010 1.551
Height 0.002 0.495 0.008 1.848
BMI –0.014 –2.048 –0.017 –2.522
Family background
Father's holding (log +1) –0.003 –2.230 –0.004 –2.056
Inherited land (log +1) 0.011 5.316 0.017 5.942
Father's education 0.012 0.544 0.010 0.347
Mother's education –0.440 –3.061 –0.671 –3.146
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.413 –6.493 –0.477 –6.125
Dummy for 1987 –0.171 –3.404 –0.250 –3.695
Intercept 0.144 0.969 0.375 0.800
Number of observations 972 777
R-squared 0.761 0.739
Notes: Estimator is nonlinear least squares.  Village fixed effects included but not shown.  All values are
in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero
observances; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.53
Table 10—Crop production function estimated with maximum education of adult
males and females
     Kharif output           Rabi output          Total output      
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage 0.319 4.702 0.408 6.655 0.412 3.956
Share of irrigated acreage 0.468 1.808 –0.131 –0.597 0.117 0.325
Value of farm tools 0.113 3.298 0.038 1.377 –0.012 –0.258
Number of bullocks 0.387 3.470 0.221 2.777 0.370 3.065
Cultivation labor 0.187 3.615 –0.045 –1.149 0.153 2.262
Share of family labor 0.101 0.447 0.119 0.616 0.318 1.014
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.210 4.078 0.225 3.819 0.615 6.002
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.004 –0.119 0.003 0.100 –0.036 –0.820
Age squared –0.000 –0.021 –0.000 –0.264 0.000 0.985
Maximum years of education 0.016 1.316 –0.021 –2.438 0.013 0.859
Raven's test score 0.010 1.325 –0.004 –0.621 –0.003 –0.361
Height 0.017 2.114 0.006 0.975 0.010 0.916
BMI 0.017 1.085 0.022 1.979 –0.016 –0.731
Adult females
Age 0.038 1.020 –0.008 –0.319 –0.014 –0.358
Age squared –0.001 –1.066 0.000 0.289 0.000 0.031
Maximum years of education 0.030 1.256 –0.015 –1.024 –0.042 –1.376
Raven's test score –0.012 –1.309 0.003 0.381 –0.007 –0.567
Height 0.003 0.287 0.005 0.758 –0.004 –0.353
BMI –0.004 –0.296 –0.000 –0.011 –0.017 –0.842
Family background
Father's holding (log +1) –0.060 –1.469 0.028 0.751 –0.058 –0.818
Inherited land (log +1) 0.020 0.357 0.031 0.739 0.139 1.554
Father's education –0.005 –0.112 0.071 1.950 –0.024 –0.317
Mother's education –0.244 –1.119 0.017 0.124 –0.065 –0.159
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.428 –3.044 –0.275 –3.147 –0.754 –4.606
Dummy for 1987 –0.240 –1.840 –0.474 –5.650 –1.080 –5.933
Intercept 0.262 0.107 4.786 3.285 3.777 1.376
Number of observations 677 752 1,013
Number of households 404 413 480
R-squared 0.7237 0.5925 0.5211
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Estimator is ordinary least squares with
village-fixed effects.  Zero land and zero labor observations have been eliminated.  Robust standard errors
with household clusters are reported.  All other human capital variables refer to the household average.  All
values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero
observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.5
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Table 11—Crop production function estimation, household random effects estimates
                     Kharif output                                               Rabi output                                               Total output                       
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage 0.321 5.383 0.390 5.946 0.392 7.366 0.337 5.509 0.422 5.161 0.450 5.331
Share of irrigated acreage 0.380 1.563 0.324 1.141 –0.148 –0.725 0.079 0.342 0.161 0.449 0.485 1.274
Value of farm tools 0.119 3.187 0.124 3.015 0.048 1.528 0.083 2.303 –0.013 –0.262 0.169 3.172
Number of bullocks 0.377 3.408 0.436 3.473 0.201 2.431 0.194 1.989 0.367 2.569 0.353 2.355
Cultivation labor 0.183 3.842 0.158 2.906 –0.073 –1.891 –0.093 –2.055 0.118 1.787 0.067 0.982
Share of family labor 0.099 0.318 0.260 0.777 0.088 0.540 0.049 0.270 0.376 1.159 0.082 0.272
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.197 4.527 0.168 3.511 0.193 3.948 0.236 4.224 0.644 8.469 0.207 6.347
Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of
Human capital capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife
Adult males
Age –0.017 –0.502 0.016 0.481 0.017 0.606 0.010 0.375 –0.042 –0.903 –0.045 –1.097
Age squared 0.000 0.304 –0.000 –0.510 –0.000 –0.682 –0.000 –0.393 0.001 1.066 0.000 1.236
Years of education 0.012 0.690 0.020 1.212 –0.023 –1.708 –0.023 –1.685 0.036 1.585 0.011 0.503
Raven's test score 0.010 1.186 0.006 0.669 –0.003 –0.480 0.000 0.064 –0.008 –0.704 –0.007 –0.603
Height 0.018 2.268 0.010 1.272 0.007 1.131 –0.002 –0.261 0.009 0.790 0.002 0.238
BMI 0.018 1.033 0.028 1.648 0.027 1.913 0.015 1.072 –0.011 –0.460 –0.021 –0.959
Adult females
Age 0.033 0.971 –0.031 –0.840 –0.010 –0.367 0.006 0.199 –0.002 –0.045 0.025 0.536
Age squared –0.000 –1.083 0.000 0.955 0.000 0.343 –0.000 –0.547 –0.000 –0.281 –0.000 –0.697
Years of education 0.053 1.394 0.071 1.555 –0.029 –0.939 –0.017 –0.472 –0.080 –1.554 0.042 0.677
Raven's test score –0.012 –1.149 –0.011 –0.998 0.004 0.472 –0.017 –1.803 –0.004 –0.294 –0.008 –0.569
Height 0.003 0.319 0.016 1.869 0.005 0.746 0.004 0.520 –0.004 –0.322 –0.002 –0.187
BMI –0.004 –0.271 –0.001 –0.084 0.001 0.133 0.013 1.284 –0.016 –0.892 –0.017 –1.040
Family background
Father's holding (log +1) –0.057 –1.095 –0.140 –2.291 0.028 0.646 –0.035 –0.696 –0.074 –0.995 –0.122 –1.512
Inherited land (log +1) 0.016 0.257 0.133 1.782 0.039 0.759 0.080 1.295 0.134 1.524 0.230 2.308
Father's education 0.002 0.047 –0.010 –0.189 0.064 1.425 0.076 1.623 –0.044 –0.602 0.089 1.168
Mother's education –0.246 –1.059 –0.337 –1.313 0.045 0.207 –0.005 –0.019 0.055 0.173 –0.830 –2.154
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.439 –3.633 –0.435 –3.126 –0.262 –3.081 –0.331 –3.357 –0.752 –5.055 –0.541 –3.458
Dummy for 1987 –0.241 –1.997 –0.291 –2.044 –0.471 –5.792 –0.536 –5.516 –1.120 –7.547 –0.622 –4.036
Intercept 0.561 0.268 0.460 0.213 4.236 2.501 5.510 3.117 3.453 1.203 7.160 2.549
Number of observations 677 546 752 601 1013 733
Number of households 404 332 413 343 480 375
R-squared within 0.0902 0.1023 0.0690 0.0777 0.1423 0.0859
R-squared between 0.7924 0.8156 0.6522 0.6584 0.6173 0.6217
Overall R-squared 0.7227 0.7324 0.5905 0.5751 0.5219 0.4934
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Zero land and zero labor observations have been eliminated.  All values are in 1986 rupees;
(log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or
better.55
Table 12—Crop production function, household fixed-effects estimates
     Kharif output           Rabi output         
Total output      
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage 0.193 1.612 0.185 1.970 0.221 1.546
Share of irrigated acreage –0.123 –0.337 –0.170 –0.489 0.671 1.160
Value of farm tools –4.153 –1.081 –7.893 –2.978 –14.560 –3.212
Number of bullocks 0.220 1.477 –0.036 –0.343 0.152 0.811
Cultivation labor 0.124 1.789 –0.136 –2.751 –0.048 –0.522
Share of family labor 0.332 0.769 0.109 0.532 0.679 1.572
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.147 1.954 0.004 0.059 0.682 6.080
Human capital
Adult males
Age 0.174 1.413 0.141 1.676 0.057 0.392
Age squared –0.002 –1.482 –0.001 –1.316 –0.000 –0.065
Years of education –0.065 –0.747 0.044 0.722 0.043 0.393
Raven's test score 0.108 1.525 –0.065 –1.377 –0.005 –0.051
Height –0.094 –1.460 –0.001 –0.036 –0.019 –0.250
BMI 0.037 0.748 0.042 1.277 0.086 1.428
Adult females
Age 0.061 0.574 0.016 0.219 0.120 0.913
Age squared –0.001 –0.505 0.000 0.184 –0.001 –0.845
Years of education 0.033 0.223 0.099 1.026 0.025 0.122
Raven's test score 0.025 0.244 0.076 1.171 0.110 0.884
Height 0.020 0.286 –0.010 –0.199 –0.031 –0.342
BMI –0.025 –0.801 –0.014 –0.636 –0.006 –0.150
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 0.364 0.453 1.395 2.587 2.291 2.463
Dummy for 1987 0.233 0.489 0.581 1.730 0.546 0.926
Intercept 44.265 1.311 66.107 2.928 112.664 2.898
Number of observations 690 764 1,030
Number of households 413 421 490
R-square within 0.1345 0.1845 0.1813
R-square between 0.0175 0.1564 0.0495
Overall R-square 0.0213 0.1457 0.0402
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Zero land and zero labor
observations have been eliminated.  Human capital variables refer to the household average.  All
values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid
losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.5
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Table 13—Crop production function, instrumental variables estimates
                     Kharif output                                               Rabi output                                               Total output                       
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage 0.012 0.034 0.624 1.303 0.906 2.237 0.255 0.467 0.203 0.288 2.211 1.982
Share of irrigated acreage –1.080 –0.769 –3.000 –1.710 –1.883 –1.316 –2.636 –1.225 0.405 0.155 6.423 1.031
Number of bullocks 0.349 2.636 0.325 1.610 0.018 0.108 0.199 0.984 0.397 2.272 –0.106 –0.298
Cultivation labor 0.303 1.243 0.290 0.925 0.168 0.861 –0.126 –0.500 0.059 0.187 –0.412 –0.661
Share of family labor –0.847 –0.311 3.138 1.007 –1.289 –0.729 –0.094 –0.059 –0.958 –0.333 –1.526 –0.488
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.372 2.348 0.266 1.079 –0.297 –0.883 0.382 1.175 0.636 1.407 –0.021 –0.083
Value of farm tools 0.104 1.594 –0.006 –0.056 0.073 1.126 0.031 0.361 0.016 0.172 –0.044 –0.298
Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of
Human capital capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife
Adult males
Age –0.023 –0.599 0.000 0.064 0.027 0.646 –0.000 –0.045 –0.054 –0.854 0.000 0.092
Age squared 0.000 0.503 0.066 1.469 –0.000 –0.648 –0.021 –0.719 0.001 0.987 0.048 0.880
Years of education 0.016 0.844 0.002 0.151 –0.017 –1.057 –0.012 –0.882 0.020 0.873 0.001 0.054
Raven's test score 0.008 0.835 0.003 0.247 –0.005 –0.658 0.006 0.500 –0.002 –0.140 –0.028 –1.151
Height 0.021 2.074 0.009 0.314 –0.003 –0.305 0.022 1.028 0.004 0.305 –0.024 –0.548
BMI 0.014 0.750 –0.023 –0.268 0.015 0.895 –0.065 –0.834 –0.031 –1.153 0.015 0.092
Adult females
Age 0.026 0.636 0.000 0.303 –0.009 –0.270 0.000 0.417 –0.036 –0.865 –0.000 –0.007
Age squared –0.000 –0.676 0.053 0.594 0.000 0.253 –0.073 –0.771 0.000 0.662 –0.234 –1.205
Years of education 0.044 1.052 –0.012 –0.712 –0.056 –1.379 –0.013 –0.839 –0.128 –1.784 0.005 0.196
Raven's test score –0.011 –1.118 0.002 0.141 0.015 1.124 0.001 0.125 –0.006 –0.486 0.001 0.051
Height –0.006 –0.522 0.005 0.205 0.004 0.482 0.028 1.249 –0.006 –0.530 –0.071 –1.281
BMI –0.001 –0.070 0.022 0.215 –0.008 –0.413 0.055 0.640 –0.014 –0.521 0.031 0.195
Family background
Father's holding (log +1) –0.040 –0.783 –0.150 –2.042 0.070 1.403 –0.003 –0.055 –0.005 –0.084 –0.051 –0.424
Inherited land (log +1) 0.031 0.379 0.145 1.246 –0.009 –0.151 0.043 0.569 0.051 0.538 0.002 0.010
Father's education –0.011 –0.197 –0.016 –0.200 0.103 2.328 0.097 1.261 –0.022 –0.273 –0.009 –0.060
Mother's education –0.391 –1.355 –0.545 –1.235 0.045 0.240 0.060 0.148 0.006 0.014 0.081 0.085
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.509 –1.885 –0.605 –1.644 –0.063 –0.292 –0.400 –2.297 –0.657 –2.238 –0.570 –2.034
Dummy for 1987 –0.235 –1.252 –0.152 –0.422 –0.255 –1.278 –0.549 –3.370 –1.119 –3.700 –0.623 –2.318
Intercept 1.783 0.628 7.016 1.659 10.034 2.864 7.118 1.429 5.894 1.188 10.138 0.873
Number of observations 655 505 729 557 981 686
Number of households 392 311 404 323 468 355
R-squared 0.6863 0.5776 0.3979 0.4515 0.5146 .
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Estimator is ordinary least squares with village fixed effects.  Zero land and zero labor
observations have been eliminated.  Robust standard errors with household clusters are reported.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the
regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.5
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Table 14—Crop production function with lagged BMI
                     Kharif output                                               Rabi output                                               Total output                       
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage 0.213 2.865 0.254 3.439 0.394 6.647 0.383 5.771 0.592 5.100 0.560 5.335
Share of irrigated acreage 0.298 0.955 0.408 0.937 –0.254 –0.949 –0.208 –0.741 –0.182 –0.383 –0.525 –0.934
Value of farm tools 0.151 3.481 0.153 2.967 0.048 1.653 0.039 1.050 –0.015 –0.225 0.163 2.508
Number of bullocks 0.206 2.081 0.187 1.667 –0.092 –1.325 –0.097 –1.152 0.146 1.235 0.024 0.177
Cultivation labor 0.134 2.257 0.083 1.575 0.114 2.440 0.140 2.594 –0.025 –0.321 0.089 1.083
Share of family labor 0.059 0.409 0.021 0.126 0.137 1.273 0.253 1.978 0.080 0.189 –0.086 –0.538
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.327 4.846 0.304 4.211 0.132 2.648 0.172 3.092 0.672 4.993 0.165 3.817
Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of
Human capital capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife
Adult males
Age –0.014 –0.381 –0.028 –0.963 0.025 0.955 –0.020 –0.647 0.003 0.066 –0.119 –3.353
Age squared 0.000 0.065 0.000 0.558 –0.000 –1.177 0.000 0.562 –0.000 –0.109 0.001 3.252
Years of education 0.008 0.362 –0.011 –0.541 –0.027 –2.105 –0.047 –3.070 0.027 1.181 –0.004 –0.161
Raven's test score 0.017 2.204 0.019 2.402 –0.002 –0.262 0.001 0.126 0.008 0.771 0.016 1.683
Height 0.010 1.128 0.006 0.722 0.009 1.263 0.003 0.350 –0.017 –1.421 –0.026 –2.047
BMI –0.006 –0.267 –0.008 –0.383 0.015 1.039 0.012 0.803 –0.030 –1.148 –0.034 –1.262
Adult females
Age 0.036 0.774 0.008 0.212 –0.021 –0.792 0.040 1.059 –0.012 –0.228 0.094 1.992
Age squared –0.000 –0.586 0.000 0.237 0.000 1.028 –0.001 –1.294 0.000 0.237 –0.001 –1.930
Years of education 0.037 0.821 0.118 1.723 –0.045 –1.533 –0.002 –0.038 –0.150 –1.949 –0.039 –0.325
Raven's test score –0.016 –1.691 –0.026 –2.288 0.014 1.585 –0.003 –0.305 –0.020 –1.395 –0.008 –0.560
Height –0.008 –0.890 0.004 0.467 –0.001 –0.153 –0.000 –0.050 –0.003 –0.314 –0.002 –0.154
BMI 0.017 1.193 0.011 0.733 0.002 0.160 –0.000 –0.041 –0.044 –1.774 –0.016 –0.758
Family background
Father's holding (log +1) –0.050 –0.948 –0.094 –1.461 0.107 2.200 0.054 0.910 –0.022 –0.215 0.022 0.234
Inherited land (log +1) 0.022 0.298 0.103 1.094 –0.076 –1.428 –0.047 –0.668 0.032 0.264 –0.011 –0.084
Father's education –0.004 –0.068 0.035 0.618 0.071 1.580 0.126 2.583 0.005 0.063 0.107 1.486
Mother's education –0.062 –0.288 –0.213 –0.696 0.292 2.054 0.123 0.658 –0.028 –0.043 –0.750 –0.888
Shifters
Dummy for 1987 0.108 0.931 0.169 1.366 –0.407 –5.113 –0.489 –5.328 –0.702 –4.973 –0.332 –2.370
Intercept 2.356 0.896 2.342 0.986 4.797 2.867 5.772 3.058 8.708 2.607 12.935 3.914
Number of observances 530 431 555 443 771 566
Number of households 382 316 367 299 450 356
R-squared 0.6972 0.6932 0.6367 0.6196 0.5431 0.5081
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Estimator is ordinary least squares with village fixed effects.  Zero land and zero labor
observations have been eliminated.  Robust standard errors with household clusters are reported.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the
regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.5
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Table 15—Crop production function with human capital cross terms
                     Kharif output                                               Rabi output                                               Total output                       
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage –0.727 –0.693 –0.431 –0.427 –1.178 –1.319 –0.898 –0.927 –0.776 –0.440 –1.061 –0.558
Share of irrigated acreage 0.378 1.755 0.371 1.696 –0.002 –0.016 –0.039 –0.260 –0.083 –0.247 –0.109 –0.318
Value of farm tools 0.144 5.004 0.142 4.911 0.037 1.540 0.038 1.599 –0.029 –0.702 –0.029 –0.691
Number of bullocks 0.227 2.685 0.227 2.662 0.160 2.622 0.165 2.703 0.263 2.553 0.271 2.601
Cultivation labor –0.037 –0.084 0.488 0.578 0.534 1.203 1.132 1.861 0.750 0.823 0.319 0.253
Share of family labor –0.152 –0.713 –0.161 –0.752 –0.010 –0.104 0.016 0.166 0.219 0.659 0.234 0.697
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.249 5.076 0.248 5.047 0.185 4.110 0.180 3.970 0.671 7.746 0.668 7.697
Land interacted with
Age 0.003 0.596 0.004 0.909 –0.002 –0.541 –0.002 –0.363 0.006 0.953 0.005 0.707
Years of education 0.003 0.241 0.003 0.279 0.014 1.617 0.023 2.299 0.021 1.393 0.024 1.448
Height 0.005 0.852 0.003 0.552 0.010 1.810 0.008 1.341 0.006 0.532 0.008 0.665
Labor interacted with
Age –0.004 –2.059 –0.001 –0.267 0.001 0.467 0.001 0.317 –0.003 –1.090 –0.006 –1.339
Years of education 0.002 0.304 0.002 0.237 –0.011 –2.564 0.001 0.113 –0.004 –0.525 0.003 0.238
Height 0.002 0.662 –0.002 –0.414 –0.003 –1.228 –0.007 –1.957 –0.003 –0.539 0.000 0.001
Human capital
Age –0.014 –1.136 –0.001 –0.093 0.013 0.565
Years of education –0.003 –0.093 –0.055 –2.683 –0.037 –0.616
Height 0.019 1.019 0.017 1.361 –0.017 –0.489
Family background
Father's holding (log +1) –0.063 –1.697 –0.060 –1.644 0.044 1.233 0.044 1.250 –0.074 –1.126 –0.079 –1.197
Inherited land (log +1) 0.032 0.637 0.031 0.621 0.001 0.034 0.006 0.155 0.076 0.962 0.084 1.056
Father's education 0.042 1.066 0.041 1.013 0.072 2.384 0.083 2.649 –0.051 –0.898 –0.047 –0.804
Mother's education –0.144 –0.608 –0.137 –0.578 –0.013 –0.125 –0.016 –0.138 –0.275 –0.645 –0.250 –0.601
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.066 –0.763 –0.061 –0.697 –0.216 –3.094 –0.217 –3.122 –0.244 –2.040 –0.239 –1.965
Dummy for 1987 0.044 0.527 0.055 0.638 –0.446 –6.765 –0.447 –6.812 –0.695 –5.837 –0.706 –5.868
Intercept 3.934 7.971 1.326 0.413 6.588 20.084 4.085 1.868 3.094 3.993 5.688 0.930
,
Number of observations 1,019 1,019 1,046 1,046 1,448 1,448
Number of households 486 486 486 486 555 555
R-squared 0.6753 0.6761 0.5549 0.5578 0.5132 0.5140
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Estimator is ordinary least squares with village fixed effects.  Zero land and zero labor
observations have been eliminated.  Robust standard errors with household clusters are reported.  Human capital variables are averages over adult males.  All
values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are
significant at the 10 percent level or better.5
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Table 16—Crop production function with residuals from labor allocation regressions
                     Kharif output                                               Rabi output                                               Total output                       
Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t
Factors of production
Cultivated acreage 0.367 5.431 0.454 6.410 0.382 6.141 0.312 4.625 0.448 4.222 0.471 4.565
Share of irrigated acreage 0.473 1.773 0.324 0.947 –0.112 –0.502 0.024 0.093 0.128 0.355 0.436 1.370
Value of farm tools 0.114 3.231 0.105 2.512 0.046 1.566 0.067 1.888 –0.020 –0.419 0.158 2.589
Number of bullocks 0.386 3.466 0.398 3.058 0.180 2.201 0.154 1.548 0.409 3.314 0.375 2.708
Cultivation labor 0.180 3.435 0.127 2.363 –0.036 –0.893 –0.057 –1.246 0.145 2.172 0.096 1.157
Share of family labor 0.159 0.788 0.184 1.025 0.118 0.624 0.325 1.396 0.363 1.177 0.155 0.591
Input expenditures (log +1) 0.193 3.804 0.144 2.612 0.221 3.622 0.276 3.939 0.615 6.058 0.210 4.024
Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of Average human Human capital of
Human capital capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife capital of household husband and wife
Adult males
Age –0.027 –0.763 –0.008 –0.267 0.010 0.394 0.002 0.079 –0.031 –0.773 –0.048 –1.203
Age squared 0.000 0.644 0.000 0.177 –0.000 –0.518 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.961 0.001 1.294
Years of education 0.006 0.369 0.020 1.175 –0.024 –2.020 –0.024 –1.865 0.024 1.192 0.006 0.299
Raven's test score 0.013 1.621 0.002 0.301 –0.003 –0.544 –0.003 –0.458 0.000 0.023 –0.004 –0.413
Height 0.013 1.653 0.001 0.168 0.006 1.014 0.003 0.401 0.006 0.657 –0.003 –0.249
BMI 0.010 0.612 0.023 1.325 0.021 1.765 0.013 0.854 –0.020 –0.908 –0.030 –1.208
Adult females
Age 0.017 0.484 –0.036 –0.963 –0.011 –0.435 –0.010 –0.276 –0.026 –0.735 0.023 0.572
Age squared –0.000 –0.541 0.000 1.162 0.000 0.414 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.511 –0.000 –0.706
Years of education 0.049 1.370 0.064 1.708 –0.037 –1.247 –0.015 –0.354 –0.097 –1.843 0.047 1.117
Raven's test score –0.012 –1.403 –0.014 –1.490 0.003 0.337 –0.014 –1.487 –0.003 –0.261 –0.007 –0.554
Height 0.003 0.340 0.009 1.081 0.006 0.967 0.003 0.534 –0.007 –0.601 –0.001 –0.136
BMI –0.001 –0.059 0.006 0.418 0.004 0.383 0.021 2.294 –0.011 –0.519 –0.013 –0.681
Family background
Father's holding (log +1) –0.025 –0.615 –0.088 –1.808 0.033 0.818 –0.006 –0.120 –0.010 –0.183 –0.053 –0.785
Inherited land (log +1) –0.006 –0.097 0.086 1.275 0.022 0.516 0.051 0.871 0.043 0.615 0.148 1.731
Father's education 0.016 0.313 0.013 0.252 0.069 1.768 0.083 1.783 –0.030 –0.414 0.114 1.417
Mother's education –0.284 –1.235 –0.377 –1.492 0.053 0.327 –0.086 –0.372 –0.008 –0.019 –0.913 –1.592
Residuals
Herding labor residuals –0.048 –1.180 –0.098 –2.013 0.031 0.861 0.052 1.123 0.104 1.935 0.073 1.214
Off–farm labor residuals –0.029 –0.767 –0.081 –1.928 –0.016 –0.515 –0.030 –0.754 –0.067 –1.439 –0.034 –0.623
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 –0.448 –3.186 –0.427 –2.695 –0.291 –3.241 –0.370 –3.339 –0.686 –4.142 –0.491 –2.722
Dummy for 1987 –0.261 –1.921 –0.286 –1.730 –0.472 –5.566 –0.495 –5.074 –1.075 –5.885 –0.588 –3.115
Intercept 1.874 0.889 3.997 2.026 4.273 2.779 5.007 3.016 4.578 1.620 7.895 2.795
Number of observations 655 505 729 557 981 686
Number of households 392 311 404 323 468 355
R-squared 0.7296 0.7493 0.5895 0.5795 0.5337 0.4954
Notes: Dependent variable is the log of the deflated value of crop output.  Estimator is ordinary least squares with village fixed effects.  Zero land and zero labor
observations have been eliminated.  Robust standard errors with household clusters are reported.  All values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the
regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or better.6
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Table 17—Tobit regression of labor use: Household average human capital
       Kharif labor                   Rabi labor                    Herding                       Nonfarm                     Total labor         
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Household composition
Household size (log) 0.392 2.392 0.311 1.995 0.413 1.149 2.394 7.598 0.835 9.323
Adult females (share) –1.620 –2.123 –1.522 –2.079 –5.262 –3.151 –1.870 –1.273 –1.441 –3.447
Children (share) –1.569 –2.776 –1.203 –2.231 –4.883 –3.855 –3.754 –3.456 –1.746 –5.651
Young (share) –1.316 –2.616 –0.848 –1.761 –2.085 –1.892 –2.964 –3.033 –1.088 –3.930
Old(share) –3.372 –3.701 –3.345 –3.834 –5.676 –2.830 –4.560 –2.549 –2.168 –4.316
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.044 –1.066 –0.060 –1.514 –0.043 –0.477 –0.077 –0.972 –0.024 –1.076
Age squared 0.000 0.951 0.001 1.578 0.001 0.692 0.001 0.736 0.000 1.145
Years of education –0.042 –2.239 –0.046 –2.590 –0.072 –1.774 0.076 2.095 0.009 0.860
Raven's test score –0.001 –0.056 –0.001 –0.133 –0.012 –0.593 0.006 0.334 –0.001 –0.268
Height 0.006 0.654 0.023 2.719 0.035 1.797 0.022 1.251 0.012 2.409
BMI –0.001 –0.058 0.005 0.267 –0.002 –0.038 0.101 2.858 0.010 0.963
Adult females
Age 0.047 1.119 0.000 0.009 –0.029 –0.317 –0.147 –1.834 –0.027 –1.206
Age squared –0.001 –1.140 –0.000 –0.289 –0.000 –0.026 0.002 1.869 0.000 1.042
Years of education –0.056 –1.426 –0.058 –1.539 –0.041 –0.482 –0.127 –1.728 –0.072 –3.425
Raven's test score 0.018 1.484 0.010 0.869 –0.017 –0.647 –0.010 –0.446 –0.004 –0.633
Height 0.002 0.179 –0.005 –0.509 0.007 0.335 –0.007 –0.383 –0.002 –0.363
BMI 0.012 0.815 0.004 0.297 –0.035 –1.046 –0.015 –0.506 –0.013 –1.622
Factors and inputs
Total owned land (log+1) 0.207 2.860 0.159 2.294 0.174 1.081 –0.151 –1.078 0.016 0.391
Share of irrigated land 0.162 0.947 0.252 1.541 0.076 0.204 –0.267 –0.810 –0.074 –0.784
Value of farm tools (log+1) 0.208 5.725 0.213 6.177 –0.121 –1.565 –0.126 –1.901 0.009 0.486
Number of livestock (log+1) 0.807 9.895 0.864 11.080 1.520 8.406 –1.064 –6.868 0.165 3.730
Share of buffaloes 0.067 0.358 0.163 0.904 1.106 2.664 –0.380 –1.056 0.033 0.324
Share of bullocks 1.178 2.336 0.946 1.951 2.379 2.102 –0.435 –0.438 0.120 0.422
Share of donkeys –0.937 –1.546 –0.264 –0.478 1.470 1.212 1.646 1.506 0.215 0.681
Share of sheep and goats –0.856 –4.287 –0.656 –3.467 –0.579 –1.360 1.527 4.180 –0.056 –0.534
Nonfarm capital –0.038 –2.266 –0.039 –2.465 –0.068 –1.932 0.087 2.829 0.022 2.445
Family background
Father's holding (log+1) 0.178 2.766 0.145 2.345 –0.006 –0.043 –0.043 –0.346 0.004 0.117
Inherited land (log+1) –0.096 –1.242 0.007 0.101 –0.051 –0.297 –0.190 –1.249 –0.045 –1.044
Father's education –0.118 –2.059 –0.111 –2.031 –0.300 –2.387 0.144 1.315 –0.039 –1.244
Mother's education 0.198 0.795 0.161 0.674 0.118 0.209 0.231 0.498 0.364 2.718
Nonearned income
Total unearned (log+1) –0.054 –3.637 –0.021 –1.488 –0.019 –0.585 –0.110 –3.850 –0.046 –5.646
Share of rental income –0.705 –4.295 –0.855 –5.446 0.297 0.849 0.505 1.606 0.001 0.010
Share of pension income 0.441 1.373 0.093 0.302 –0.482 –0.687 0.726 1.199 0.156 0.885
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 0.671 4.803 0.091 0.681 1.038 3.455 0.315 1.184 0.153 2.013
Dummy for 1987 –1.062 –7.751 –0.314 –2.420 0.542 1.859 0.627 2.449 –0.152 –2.069
Intercept –0.381 –0.158 –1.118 –0.485 –0.360 –0.069 2.776 0.596 4.713 3.569
Selection-term 1.625 1.568 3.381 3.145 0.936
Number of observations 1,385 1,385 1,385 1,385 1,385
Censored 353 323 601 430 19
Noncensored 1,032 1,062 784 955 1,366
Pseudo R-square 0.213 0.191 0.092 0.064 0.112
Notes: Village fixed effects included but not shown.  Kharif and rabi labor include hired labor.  Total family labor = family labor in kharif and rabi cultivation, herding, and off–farm work.  All
values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or
better.6
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Table 18—Tobit regression of labor use:  Husband and wife human capital
       Kharif labor                   Rabi labor                    Herding                       Nonfarm                     Total labor         
Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z Coefficient z
Household composition
Household size (log) 0.509 2.777 0.628 3.533 0.654 1.594 3.142 8.506 1.124 11.681
Adult females (share) –1.755 –2.119 –1.815 –2.248 –3.695 –2.045 –2.783 –1.679 –2.110 –4.888
Children (share) –1.705 –2.851 –1.702 –2.932 –4.978 –3.705 –6.093 –5.038 –2.693 –8.575
Young (share) –1.238 –2.394 –1.200 –2.386 –2.093 –1.850 –4.615 –4.375 –1.987 –7.289
Old (share) –2.798 –2.932 –3.630 –3.907 –3.900 –1.848 –7.957 –4.062 –3.307 –6.604
Human capital
Adult males
Age –0.028 –0.757 –0.004 –0.101 0.139 1.605 –0.116 –1.529 0.031 1.579
Age squared 0.000 0.460 –0.000 –0.198 –0.002 –1.946 0.001 1.519 –0.000 –1.886
Years of education –0.025 –1.300 –0.024 –1.324 –0.102 –2.395 0.086 2.253 0.008 0.812
Raven's test score –0.007 –0.752 –0.017 –1.838 0.011 0.520 –0.030 –1.486 –0.009 –1.830
Height 0.005 0.556 0.028 3.233 0.021 1.067 0.028 1.586 0.013 2.766
BMI –0.016 –0.840 –0.003 –0.173 0.025 0.603 0.118 3.187 0.025 2.571
Adult females
Age 0.084 2.043 0.010 0.251 –0.035 –0.380 –0.110 –1.335 –0.005 –0.214
Age squared –0.001 –2.034 –0.000 –0.229 0.000 0.205 0.001 1.652 0.000 0.009
Years of education –0.039 –0.800 –0.073 –1.525 –0.004 –0.035 0.128 1.370 0.021 0.844
Raven's test score –0.001 –0.079 –0.002 –0.184 –0.041 –1.468 0.003 0.129 –0.008 –1.211
Height –0.000 –0.019 –0.002 –0.260 0.011 0.499 0.009 0.451 0.010 1.962
BMI 0.028 1.995 0.015 1.116 –0.041 –1.339 –0.031 –1.143 –0.006 –0.900
Factors and inputs
Total owned land (log+1) 0.205 2.553 0.178 2.289 0.278 1.534 –0.284 –1.737 –0.061 –1.437
Share of irrigated land 0.057 0.308 0.016 0.088 0.209 0.516 –0.288 –0.776 –0.077 –0.799
Value of farm tools (log+1) 0.187 4.665 0.179 4.608 –0.111 –1.272 –0.271 –3.518 –0.026 –1.277
Number of livestock (log+1) 0.728 8.120 0.726 8.345 1.596 7.870 –1.090 –6.141 0.147 3.168
Share of buffaloes –0.071 –0.342 0.150 0.752 1.848 3.981 –0.683 –1.659 –0.079 –0.739
Share of bullocks 0.945 1.698 0.734 1.361 1.863 1.478 –0.961 –0.849 –0.080 –0.269
Share of donkeys 0.021 0.034 –0.243 –0.420 3.199 2.566 0.293 0.252 0.407 1.313
Share of sheep and goats –0.771 –3.499 –0.549 –2.574 –0.298 –0.622 1.581 3.736 –0.017 –0.150
Nonfarm capital –0.048 –2.564 –0.060 –3.358 –0.118 –2.969 0.114 3.200 0.039 4.106
Family background
Father's holding (log+1) 0.218 2.862 0.192 2.609 –0.091 –0.527 0.006 0.041 0.045 1.120
Inherited land (log+1) –0.137 –1.474 –0.039 –0.426 –0.232 –1.097 0.015 0.077 0.000 0.002
Father's education –0.064 –1.054 –0.068 –1.166 –0.300 –2.243 –0.042 –0.348 –0.114 –3.657
Mother's education 0.168 0.607 0.262 0.973 0.125 0.195 –0.827 –1.565 0.034 0.242
Nonearned income
Total unearned (log+1) –0.062 –3.705 –0.027 –1.709 –0.046 –1.261 –0.094 –2.841 –0.047 –5.398
Share of rental income –0.655 –3.597 –0.856 –4.865 0.262 0.674 0.541 1.499 0.044 0.471
Share of pension income 0.329 0.936 0.238 0.704 –0.420 –0.551 0.755 1.098 0.110 0.600
Shifters
Dummy for 1986 0.788 5.188 0.169 1.148 0.604 1.846 0.267 0.890 0.182 2.312
Dummy for 1987 –1.037 –6.906 –0.292 –2.028 0.155 0.485 0.682 2.343 –0.101 –1.315
Intercept –0.613 –0.248 –3.078 –1.286 –2.738 –0.501 2.190 0.445 1.872 1.463
Selection-term 1.564 1.521 3.239 3.110 0.849
Number of observations 1,089 1,089 1,089 1,089 1,089
Censored 256 239 473 345 12
Noncensored 833 850 616 744 1,077
Pseudo R-square 0.2132 0.1916 0.1101 0.0719 0.1457
Notes: Village fixed effects included but not shown.  Kharif and rabi labor include hired labor.  Total family labor = family labor in kharif and rabi cultivation, herding, and off-farm work.  All
values are in 1986 rupees; (log +1) means that the regressor is computed as Log (x+1) to avoid losing zero observations; t and F statistics in bold are significant at the 10 percent level or
better.62
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